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Few industries have undergone so many significant changes to general framework conditions 
in such a short period as Europe’s electricity sector at the dawn of the new millennium: 
market opening, third-party access, renewable support schemes, emissions trading, incentive 
regulation, and many more measures were all introduced within one decade. Despite the many 
setbacks and delays, the European wholesale electricity markets moved irresistibly from a 
national monopolistic to an international oligopolistic structure. The corresponding facts and 
figures are impressive: the share of electricity traded at the European Energy Exchange, 
Leipzig (EEX) spot market rose from under 1% in 2000 to around 18% in 2007; more 
transmission links are congested due to increasing international trade; a few “national” 
blackouts have disseminated throughout Europe; and small German municipalities have 
begun trading with generators in Spain.  
 
It is exciting to undertake research at this time, but there is always the danger that one’s 
findings may become obsolete before publication, or disproved by newly available data. 
Nonetheless, the attractions for researchers are substantial: the opportunity to be the first on a 
particular subject; the vibrant collegiality of the international research community; the interest 
of the general public and newly appointed regulators; and finally, the privilege of attending 
conferences in the most beautiful places throughout Europe. All are rewards enough for the 
hours spent preparing sometimes futile data sets, or reworking hypotheses.  
 
I am especially appreciative of my supervisor, Christian von Hirschhausen, and my colleagues 
Franziska Holz and Anne Neumann, who provided the necessary confidence, and made 
themselves available when questions arose. Christian von Hirschhausen introduced me to the 
scientific community – my first presentation before a large, international audience occurred 
only 5 months after I began work in this field – and later challenged me with projects whose 
findings I incorporated in this dissertation.  
 
Further, I thank the examiners of this thesis. Derek Bunn made possible a three-month 
research visit to the London Business School that proved especially productive. Bringing me 
together with energy economics PhD students and regularly creating time for conversation 
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Derek Bunn provided important assistance. With Jean-Michel Glachant I associate a set of 
stimulating discussions, particularly in the frame of the French-German PhD-seminars that his 
chair, together with Christian von Hirschhausen, alternately hosts in Paris and Berlin. I also 
acknowledge Bernhard Schipp, who kindly agreed to support my dissertation.  
 
 






This dissertation applies a variety of quantitative methods to European electricity market data 
to enable us to detect, understand, and eventually mitigate market imperfections. The 
empirical data indicate that market power and barriers to cross-border trade partially explain 
today’s market failures. Briefly, the five key findings of this dissertation are: 
First, we observe a decoupling between German electricity prices and fuel cost, even though 
British electricity prices are largely explained by short-run cost factors.  
Second, we demonstrate that rising prices of European Union emission allowances (EUA) 
have a greater impact on German wholesale electricity prices than falling EUA prices. 
Third, we reject the assumption of full integration of European wholesale electricity markets 
in 2002-2006; for several pairs of countries, the weaker hypothesis of (bilateral) convergence 
is accepted (i.e. efforts to develop a single European market for electricity have been only 
partially successful). 
Fourth, we observe that daily auction prices of scarce cross-border transmission capacities are 
insufficient to explain the persistence of international price differentials. Empirically, our 
findings confirm the insufficiency of explicit capacity auctions as stated in the theoretical 
literature. 
Fifth, we identify inefficiencies in the market behavior for the interconnector linking France 
and the United Kingdom (UK), for which several explanations, including market power, may 
be plausible. 
 
The thesis is structured in six chapters. Following this summary, Chapter I presents an 
overview of the issues concerning European electricity wholesale markets. The four core 
chapters, II-V, provide empirical indication for inefficiencies in European wholesale 
electricity markets. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the contributions of this dissertation and 











I.1 Brief Introduction to European Wholesale Electricity Markets 
 
Electricity markets differ from other commodity markets in many aspects. Demand for 
electricity is inelastic in the short term, storing it is impossible, components of the value chain 
exhibit characteristics of natural monopolies, and reliable supply has great macroeconomic 
importance. In the latter half of the twentieth century, these features gave rise to 
uncompetitive market structures in many countries. In Europe and the United States (US), 
privately or public owned vertically integrated regional monopolies predominated. However, 
during the revival of economic liberalism in the 1980s (“Thatcherism” and “Reaganism”), 
vertical integration began to be challenged.1 Why this paradigm shift to privatizing many 
state-owned industries (not only in the electricity sector) occurred in precisely this decade and 
arose first in the Anglo-Saxon world is only partially understood today. Cockett (1994) argues 
that the intellectual climate itself changed during the 1970s and 1980s. A survey of the 
political economy literature reveals that strongly conservative governments, like the Thatcher 
and Reagan administrations, are more likely to promote and realize privatization projects.2 
Others argue that increasing fiscal deficits, growing state shares, booming stock markets, 
diminishing performance of state-owned enterprises,3 and the general failure of Keynesian 
policy following the oil price shocks of the 1970s influenced the transformation “from state to 
market”.4
Following the United States and United Kingdom’s (UK) experiences, the liberalization of 
European electricity markets began to gain momentum during the 1990s, with the backing of 
the UK administration and the European Commission. In 1991, the European Community’s 
(EC) Energy Commissioner, Antonio Cardoso e Cunha, proposed a directive liberalizing gas 
and electricity markets. Five years later, after fierce battles between the electricity industry 
and liberalization-skeptical countries on one side and pro-liberalization countries and the 
Commission of the EC on the other, the electricity market Directive 1996/92/EC was enacted. 
In this context, Article 90 [now 86] of the European Economic Community treaty equipped 
  
 
                                                 
1 Kahn (1995) describes the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, which allows for 
independent generators, as the watershed of US electricity market policy. He notes that by 1992, independent 
power producers already accounted for 10.7% of US electricity sales. 
2 See Boix (1997), Bortolotti et al. (2003), and Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004). 
3 Fabrizio et al. (2004) empirically demonstrate that the efficiency of restructured power plants in the US indeed 
increases. 
4 See Heffernan (2002). 
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the Commission with the necessary unilateral power to break up national monopolies; it also 
functioned as a lever to enforce the collaboration of reluctant member states in drafting the 
reform package. Despite its departure from requiring full liberalization (continued existence 
of the “single buyer model”; “public service obligations”; high thresholds for market 
opening), the directive laid the groundwork for restructuring Europe’s markets.5 Yet the 
ultimate goal of a single, vibrant electricity market was still far off.6
The diversity of national approaches to electricity market reform can be explained by country-
specific characteristics. Important determinants include political will; political ability; 
strength of interest groups; and path dependency. Therefore, the failure to achieve certain 
targets – diagnosed in the EC sector inquiry, for example – will have different reasons. In 
Europe, some administrations were reluctant to expose their “strategic industry” to market 
conditions. The complexity of reforming an age-old industry structure continues to pose 
serious challenges for other administrations.
  
 
The next significant step was taken in 2003 when the European Union (EU) issued Directive 
2003/54/EC and Regulation 1228/2003. Both obliged member states to undertake further 
substantial reform efforts, requiring that markets be opened; obstacles to cross-border trade be 
reduced; and that non-discriminatory third-party access to the network be guaranteed. To date, 
implementation (via the enactment of national laws) still varies. Even a cursory read of the 




Apart from privatization, unbundling, and retail competition; creating a common competitive 
electricity wholesale market was a desired goal of Europe’s electricity market policy, for 
which workable national wholesale markets are the cornerstone (see Section 
 In some cases, governments gave priority to 
competing environmental, economic or social policy targets. 
 
I.3). Thus, 
consumers were allowed to choose their supplier. In general, this market opening was 
implemented in steps; most countries first permitted only the largest consumers to “shop 
around.” Subsequently, bilateral trading and brokered deals were introduced. This so-called 
over-the-counter trade (OTC) provided custom-tailored products at low, fixed-transaction 
                                                 
5 Andersen and Sitter (2007). 
6 A single market refers to the expectation of a competitive market and the efficient allocation of generation and 
transmission resources, at least at a regional level, if not at the level of the new EU 25. 
7 For example, we observe that the arduous process of reform requires specialized education and training for 
administrations and regulators and these were disseminated only gradually. 
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costs. But as variable transaction and search costs remained high and market non-transparency 
incurred additional expense, traders and buyers demanded another marketplace that offered 
standardized products. Today, most of the older and some of the new EU member states have 
established power exchanges, nearly all of which feature a spot market (electricity trading for 
each hour of the day ahead). The prices deduced at the power exchanges are usually publicly 
available. Because they serve as a national reference price, most countries regard spot prices 
as the key indicators for the wholesale price level.8
With the emergence of electricity spot markets, the statistical behavior of the prices attracted 
the attention of speculators, arbitrageurs and risk managers, not least because future and 
option contracts are usually settled at the spot price. This opened a new field of study for 
financial mathematics, and it soon became obvious that electricity prices behave very 
differently from prices for physical commodities. Important findings include the observations 
that prices mostly contain no unit root (Lucia and Schwartz (2001), 
Worthington et al. (2005)); exhibit mean reverting behavior (Cartea and Figueroa (2005)); 
feature strong seasonalities; high volatility; fat tails; and long memory behavior (Haldrup and 
Nielsen (2004)). Sophisticated stochastic models for electricity prices were developed based 





 As weather, fuel prices, emission allowance prices, available 
generation capacities, imports, transmission congestion, market structure and the national fuel 
mix are key explanatory variables for price behavior; electricity price models are often only 
suitable for a specific power exchange. Electricity prices in the Scandinavian countries for 
example contain a unit root unlike those in the UK (the high share of hydropower makes 
electricity indirectly storable in the Nordic countries, which is not the case in the thermally 
dominated UK market). Subsection  will discuss the national specificity of electricity price 
behavior in relation to cross-border electricity trade.  
 
Market implementation did not proceed without difficulties. The low liquidity, unexplained 
price jumps, persistent international price differences, repeated allegations of insider trading 
and market power exercise have all fuelled conjectures that Europe’s markets are inefficient. 
                                                 
8 Comparative studies show that German and British OTC prices are highly correlated with their respective 
power exchange prices (see Figure 24 for example). 
9 Haldrup and Nielsen (2004) for example find a regime switching long memory model to adequately forecast 
spot prices in the Nordic market. Periodic heteroskedastic autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average 
model models were proposed by Carnero et al. (2003), and Cartea and Figueroa (2005) suggests jump diffusion 
models. Overviews of the relevant literature can be found in Bunn (2004), Knittel and Roberts (2004) and 
Skantze and Ilic (2001). 
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This thesis is designed to empirically analyze whether or not European electricity prices are 
the result of perfectly functioning competitive markets by focusing on two sources of 
inefficiencies in wholesale markets, namely, barriers to cross-border trade and the exercise of 
market power. Both issues are introduced in the next two sections. 
 
I.2 Market Power 
 
During the process of reform, not surprisingly, more attention was paid to incorporating the 
natural monopoly, i.e. the transmission and distribution networks, within a competitive market 
structure. However, the remaining vertical and horizontal integration as well as the 
widespread existence of national incumbents often provide significant market power. In 
electricity generation sectors throughout the world the combination of significant market 
concentration with high and/or increasing electricity prices put forth the hypothesis that 
market power was actually exercised. Consequently, the European Commission ordered an 
examination of the gas and electricity sectors to “investigate the [market power] allegations 
and to assess the reasons for rigidity in prices.” These early results highlight the potential for 
market power in terms of market concentration, but fail to provide final evidence for its 
exercise.10 Simply put, the exercise of market power often appears straightforward to the 
public, but hard evidence is difficult to produce. Economists have attempted to address this 
problem by applying several methodologies. 11
A company is said to exercise market power if it profitably raises/lowers the market price 




                                                 
10 The sector inquiry (EC 2007, p.150) supposes that physical withholding and overbidding might play a role. 
11 The first theoretical studies of market power in the power sector were undertaken in the 1970s, e.g., Weiss 
(1975). The political discussion, however, is almost as old as the electricity industry. Stier (1999) for example 
shows that earlier than 1910 the monopolization of electricity supply in Germany stimulated a broad political 
discussion about how the state should intervene to prevent a sustainable monopoly. The question was whether 
the state should create a state-owned electricity segment to compete with the expanding RWE or whether it was 
more efficient to use the powers of the state (e.g., building laws) to regulate the private sector. Various political 
and financial reasons led Prussia to finally choose the first alternative. It would be an interesting exercise to 
study what would have happened if unbundling had been an option in the relatively liberal policy climate one 
hundred years ago. 
12 Stoft (2002, p.318). 
 Therefore, demonstrating the exercise of market 
power encompasses two steps: First, it needs to be shown that a company’s price-setting 
strategy differs from competitive behavior, and second, it is necessary to demonstrate that this 
strategy is profitable for the utility. Most studies assume that companies (can) exercise market 
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power mainly by bidding above marginal cost.13 Consequently, Borenstein et al. (2002) state 
that there are essentially two monitoring strategies: one that deduces the exercise of market 
power from extraordinary price-cost difference, and another that attempts to directly reveal 
abusive company strategies by analyzing individual bidding and supply decisions. The first 
approach requires estimating the marginal cost of electricity production for a specific period 
and comparing it with the corresponding electricity prices. As the required data on individual 
prices, volumes, cost and production functions are generally unavailable, most academic 
studies confine themselves to analyzing the exercise of market power on a sector-wide level. 
Starting from the assumption that in an oligopolistic electricity wholesale market, companies 
can increase their profits by restricting their supply (physical withholding) or bidding above 
cost (financial withholding) the hypothesis that prices deviate from marginal cost is tested.14 
The major difficulty is obtaining reliable estimates for hour-by-hour electricity production 
cost. Despite being a homogenous good, electricity is produced by very different 
technologies. Each power plant features an individual marginal cost curve that depends on 
fuel prices, workload-dependent heat rate, inter-temporal cost (e.g., ramping cost, or 
opportunity cost of hydropower) and other factors. International trade, stochasticity of supply 
and demand and uncertainty add to the complexity. Finally, predicting the circumstances in 
which the generator with the highest marginal cost recovers its fixed cost remains 
unresolved.15 As a result, the true cost of generation can only be approximated.16
The second approach analyzes each company’s data.
 Despite 
these caveats, this approach is widely used because it allows assessing the size of market 
power exercise and its development over time. 
 
17
                                                 
13 Note that underbidding might also be ”appropriate” to create excess revenues for the vertically integrated 
electricity supply companies (e.g., Kühn and Machado (2004)). 
14 Newbery et al. (2005) provide a summary of some of the existing electricity market monitoring approaches. 
Studies for certain European markets have been produced by: Fehr and Harbord (1993), Short and Swan (2002), 
Fabra and Toro (2003), Evans and Green (2003), Müsgens (2006), Schwarz and Lang (2006), Hirschhausen et al. 
(2007), Wolfram (1999), Wolak and Patrick (2001), Burns et al. (2004), and Sweeting (2004). 
15 See for example, Hartley and Moran (2000), Brennan (2002) and Weber (2002). 
16 In describing the difficulties of estimating generation cost, Swider et al. (2007) challenge a series of existing 
studies of the German market. 
17 Examples are Wolak and Patrick (2001), Wolfram (1998), Bushnell and Wolak (1999), Wolak (2000) and 
Puller (2001). 
 Again, the complexity of electricity 
production makes cast-iron proofs of market power behavior difficult even with such data. 
Showing that a company takes certain plants offline, notably in those moments when the 
resulting price development increase the value of its remaining production, for example, is no 
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evidence for physical withholding.18 In the potentially profitable on-peak demand periods, 
more (and older) power plants operate and thus outages become more probable.19
Analyzing the bidding behavior is only possible when data on individual players’ bidding 
behavior are available and trading via the observable market is compulsory.
  
 
20 Provided with 
data on bidding behavior on certain spot markets, evidence for strategic bidding was found.21
Alternative testing approaches that require less-specific data are desirable. In this context, 
econometric time-series and cross-sectional techniques could provide a valuable 
complementary methodology for revealing signs of market power exercise. But quantitative 
approaches such as cross-country comparisons of electricity prices or case studies of the 
electricity price effects of mergers or generation cost shocks have rarely been employed. To 
rectify the situation, this dissertation develops and adapts methodologies to study the 
company level usage of interconnectors (Chapter 
 
Transparent compulsory markets are, however, uncommon, restricting the number of 
analyzable cases. 
 
V); the interaction of prices and certain 
generation cost components (Chapter II); and the pass-through of cost shocks (Chapter III) 
utilizing European market data. 
                                                 
18 Examples for this approach are Joskow and Kahn (2002) as well as Patton et. al. (2002). 
19 Joskow and Kahn (2002) argued that during the California electricity crisis of 2000-2001, some companies 
increased profits by deliberately withholding physical capacity. Equipped with company data, Harvey et al. 
(2004) were able to successfully challenge this evidence based on the argument that outages become more likely 
at higher loads. 
20 If spot market participation is voluntary, trading via the non-transparent OTC market makes the observable 
spot market bids difficult to interpret.  
21 Such studies have, for example, been undertaken by Fabra and Toro (2005) and Bovenzi (2007) for the 
Spanish and by Hortacsu and Puller (2005) for the Texas spot markets. 
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I.3 Cross-Border Trade 
 
Increasing cross-border electricity trade improves total welfare via different channels: First, if 
supply and demand conditions in the linked markets are not fully correlated, the common on-
peak demand is usually lower than the sum of the individual on-peak demands, thus 
increasing the security of supply of both systems (or allows substantial cost reductions of the 
security margins). Second, connecting systems with different plant portfolios (and thus 
marginal generation cost curves) allow for substantial cost reductions (the link between 
hydropower-dominated Switzerland and nuclear-dominated France, for example, provides 
cheaper night-time electricity for Switzerland and cheaper daytime electricity for France). 
Third, in addition to smoothing the cost curve that allows lower marginal cost for each 
demand scenario, the cost curve for ancillary services (like minute reserve or frequency 
control) is also stretched (and costs are reduced). Finally, the scale efficiencies of electricity 
generation become negligible at a certain level of size. Thus, in a sufficiently large market, 
electricity generation should not be a natural monopoly.22 Therefore, a common wholesale 
market that supports a significant number of sustainable competitors could efficiently mitigate 
market power.23
Historically, the majority of (West
 
 
24-) European cross-border transmission lines were 
engineered and constructed to increase the security of supply of the mainly autarkic national 
electricity systems.25
As companies unbundled, markets opened and third-party access was implemented, new 
competitors and traders clamored to enter this often highly profitable market. The 
 International electricity trade usually occurred in the form of bilateral 
agreements between national monopolies. The world was small enough that transmission 
operators often knew one another: one anecdote relates an instance when the BEWAG 
(former Berlin vertically integrated monopolist) called his Polish counterpart to ask for more 
power after a BEWAG plant went down.  
 
                                                 
22 Based on an estimate of Christensen and Greene (1976), Kahn (1995) suggests that 4000 Megawatt (MW) is a 
fairly accurate threshold. 
23 For the benefits of electricity interconnectors, see Turvey (2006). 
24 In the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) period, the high-voltage system of the German 
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland and other COMECON 
Members was jointly operated by the Central Dispatch Organization of the Interconnected Power Systems 
(CDO/IPS) in Prague (Lagendijk (2005)). 
25 For an overview of the history of cross-border transmission networks in Europe, see Lagendijk and Schipper 
(2006). 
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marketization of cross-border electricity trade, however, proceeded only gradually as the 
necessary institutions were introduced step-by-step. The challenge was to create an 
institutional framework that allowed for the optimal use of an existing transmission 
infrastructure that had never been designed to host significant and fluctuating commercial 
flows. The major technical constraint was the insufficiency of cross-border transmission 
capacity. Therefore, the “right” to use the limited capacities in times of excess demand had to 
be allocated to the interested parties. Since the EC did not set forth the introduction of a 
common mechanism, member states were free to negotiate bilateral agreements, and a variety 
of rationing methods were created. The congestion management methods included the 
uneconomic first-come, first-served approaches used by Belgium and France before 2006; the 
explicit auctions used by Germany and the Netherlands; and the implicit auctions used in the 
NordPool area.26
Apart from allocation distortions, the non-auction-based congestion management methods 
also failed to provide data on the utilization of the interconnection lines and the actual 
willingness to pay for the limited capacities. Therefore, the EU implicitly banned them in 
Regulation 1228/2003, by requiring congestion management to be organized in a “market-
based” manner. Consequently, three types of capacity-auctions prevail in 2007: the allocation 





                                                 
26 For details on the congestion management methods see ETSO (2004). The advantages and disadvantages of 
these methods are discussed in ETSO (2004) and CONSENTEC (2004). 
27 In December 2006, Belgium, France and the Netherlands introduced an additional scheme called market 
coupling that combines implicit and explicit auctions. 
 
 
In implicit auctions, the markets for electricity and for transmission rights are pooled. A 
market operator collects bid and offer curves at each of the linked electricity markets. It 
computes optimal prices for each market as well as the flows between them with respect to 
the transmission constraints. Consequently, the prices at only two electricity markets will 
differ if bringing more electricity from the lower- to the higher-price region is not possible. 
The difference between two regional market prices for the corresponding right to transmit 
electricity is called the shadow price.  
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In bilateral and coordinated explicit auctions, the markets for electricity and for transmission 
rights are separated.28
Table 1
 Therefore, a trader intending to sell German electricity in the 
Netherlands must purchase both the electricity and the right to use the transmission line. 
Transmission rights for the different delivery periods (hour, day, month, and year) are usually 
sold in sealed-bid auctions.  
 
 illustrates the necessary steps for performing international arbitrage in the day-ahead 
market: the transmission capacity available in the daily auction is announced; bids are 
submitted; the auction is closed; and the winning results are announced. While the 
transmission capacity auction is held, the power exchanges are collecting bids and selling 
offers. At a specified time after the auction results are published, the power exchanges close 
the bidding, calculate the spot prices, and announce them. Therefore, a trader wanting to do 
arbitrage operations by selling cheaper German power to the Netherlands must first bid on 
transmission capacity absent knowledge of the exact spot prices and then submit its sell offer 
for electricity at the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) knowing only the transmission 
auction results. After receiving the APX price, the transmission capacity price and the 
quantities it has purchased, the trader can now bid to purchase German power at the European 
Energy Exchange in Leipzig (EEX).29
Figure 20
 From this example, it is clear that explicit auctions do 
not necessarily result in (full informational) arbitrage freeness. This is confirmed empirically 
by two observations: first, electricity often flows against the price differential (see  
in Chapter V) and second, electricity price differences do not equal capacity auction prices 
(see Figure 11 in Chapter IV).  
                                                 
28 In bilateral auctions, only the transmission rights between two adjacent markets (e.g. Germany and the 
Netherlands) are sold, while in coordinated auctions, the transmission rights between more than two markets are 
sold at once (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany and Poland). Therefore, a single coordinated auction is in general 
more efficient because it can better account for the physical interactions in a meshed network (loop-flows). 
29 This example ignores the possibility that the trader may possess long-term contracts in one or more of the 
three markets. 
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Table 1: Timing of cross-border auctions and spot markets in 2005 







Elspot32 EEX  
Announcement of available transfer capacity 8:30 9:00    
End of bidding 9:00 9:30 10:30 12:00 12:00 
Publication of results 9:30 10:00 11:00 12:00 12:15 
 
To understand the functioning of cross-border trade, it is useful to study international price 
differences and international price shock diffusion. Although numerous articles analyzing 
European wholesale spot prices have appeared recently, there has been little research on the 
interactions of prices at different exchanges. Studies of the interrelations of regional markets 
mostly focus on non-European countries. Popova (2004) models the prices in the twelve 
transmission zones of the Pennsylvania Jersey Maryland market via a spatial error model, 
finding that spatial correlations are an important factor in price determination. Jerko et al. 
(2002) uses a structural Vector Auto Regression to analyze interactions of spot prices in the 
Western US. Videbeck (2004) analyzes the different prices at the nodes of the New Zealand 
pool. DeVany and Walls (1999) use co-integration analysis to assess the arbitrage freeness of 
electricity spot prices in the Western US between different locations.  
 
While efficiency of cross-border trade has been analyzed for the US the inefficiencies of 
European-style explicit auction have not been subject to empirical investigations. This thesis 
employs two methods to quantitatively assess the functioning of West and Central European 
cross-border electricity trade. Chapter IV analyzes how market integration has developed over 
time and whether explicit auctions induce arbitrage freeness. A case study on the causes of the 
detected inefficiencies is provided in Chapter V. 
 
                                                 
30 This example relies on the capacity auction procedure for capacities between the German transmission system 
operator E.on Netz and the Dutch transmission system operator TenneT. 
31 This example relies on the capacity auction procedure for capacities between the German transmission system 
operator E.on Netz and the West Danish transmission system operator ELTRA. 
32 Elspot is the Nordic spot market on which electricity for the West Danish price zone is traded. 
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II A Markov Switching Model of the Merit Order to Compare UK 
and German Price Formation 
II.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces a stylized model of the price formation in competitive electricity spot 
markets. The goodness-of-fit and the parameter estimates of the model provide a measure for 
the fuel cost-reflectiveness of wholesale prices that can be compared across countries and 
time. The model allows us to track the differences in the national price formation 
mechanisms, and shows the market’s developments and their inefficiencies. Thus, a thorough 
interpretation of the obtained cost-reflectiveness of national prices could provide a first 
indicator about a market’s efficiency. Therefore, instead of calculating the absolute deviation 
of the electricity price from the respective generation cost, we establish a stylized model of 
the marginal electricity generation cost. Next, the model is estimated over time assuming that 
the wholesale prices equal marginal cost. Last, we compare the empirical parameters and the 
residuals of the estimation across countries to assess where and when prices are best 
explained by their fundamentals, and to identify deviations from competitive price setting.  
 
The next section introduces selective data about the two countries used in our model: the UK 
and Germany. Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 presents the results and an 
interpretation, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
II.2 Data  
 
The German and UK electricity systems are comparable in size (see Table 1). Conventional 
thermal power plants account for most of the electricity generation (65% in Germany and 
77% in the UK). One obvious difference is that the UK does not use lignite for which it 
compensates by an increased share of natural gas. However, both countries differ markedly in 
market structure and design. While the UK has two decades of experience with market 
opening and regulation, Germany only addressed sector reforms in the first part of this 
decade, and only established a national regulator in mid-2005. The four privately owned 
transmission system operators in Germany retain significant stakes in generation (together 
80% of total capacity) and distribution. The integration of the two major German players, 
E.on and RWE, and their natural gas affiliates enhances their dominance. The situation in the 
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UK, on the other hand, is more balanced. The transmission system operator (TSO) is 
unbundled and national regulation is effective. The nine largest generation companies 
together own only 68% of the capacity. Although they are integrated with electricity and gas 
suppliers, no one has a position comparable to the “big four” in Germany. 
 
Table 2: Gross electricity generation (2005) 
 Germany UK 
Hydropower plants 4 % 2 % 
Nuclear power plants 26 % 20 % 
Coal-fired power plants 21 % 34 % 
Lignite-fired power plants 23 %  
Natural gas-fired power plants 11 % 38 % 
Others 15 % 6 % 
Annual gross electricity generation in TWh 620 401 
Source: Eurostat33 
 
Both countries’ wholesale markets are particularly suited to our model. First, neither market 
is endowed with significant hydropower capacity. This is an advantage because our model is 
unable to reproduce the dynamic opportunity cost assessment required for analyzing the 
marginal cost of a hydro plant. Second, both markets provide reference prices. Hourly spot 
electricity prices for Germany are obtained from the EEX (prices are formed by day-ahead, 
two-side, one-shot, sealed-bid uniform-price auctions). By contrast, half-hourly spot prices at 
the UK Power Exchange (UKPX) are obtained in 48-hour continuous trading until a half-hour 
ahead of delivery.34
Table 3: Summary of the data sample (February 2002-December 2006) 
 
 
  Germany United Kingdom 
 Unit Source Mean Variance Source Mean Variance 
Electricity off-peak  €/MWhel EEX 29.5 160 UKPX 31.4 220 
Electricity on-peak €/MWhel35 EEX  48.3 839 UKPX 44.9 764 
Gas spot price  €/MWhth TTF 13.5 26 NBP 14.1 70 
Coal spot price  €/MWhth ARA 5.8 1 ARA 5.8 1 




                                                 
33 The data were retrieved from [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu] via the data navigation tree. 
34 Most of the high-frequency price and volume data employed in this dissertation were not freely available, but 
could only be obtained upon request from the corresponding data providers. The usage rules did not allow a 
publication of the original data in this dissertation. 
35 MWhel stands for one Megawatt hour of electric energy. 
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Because our model is only meaningful in the short and medium run, we used daily price 
notations for all commodities. Since no daily German gas and coal prices were available, we 
employ the respective values of the Dutch markets for natural gas (TTF36) and coal 
(ARA37).38 These data have been obtained from Datastream39. The sample contains data from 
February 2002 to December 2006, eliminating weekends and holidays.40
Figure 1
 We converted the 
fuel prices into Euro per calorific value measured in Megawatt (€/MWhth) to simplify 
interpretation. The respective data sources for the three commodities for Germany and the UK 
are summarized in Table 2.  depicts the series of spot prices; on-peak and off-peak 
prices approximately doubled between 2002 and 2006. Gas prices also doubled, whereas coal 
prices reached their initial level at the end of 2006.41
Figure 1: Development of the spot price series 2002-2006 (in €/MWh) 
 Emission allowance prices increased 
from € 10 to € 30 and then returned to € 10 in the same period.  
 







































                                                 
36 TTF stands for Title Transfer Facility, a virtual trading point for natural gas in the Netherlands. 
37 CIF ARA coal prices (CIF refers to Cost, Insurance and Freight and ARA refers to Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Antwerp). 
38 It should be noted that gas and especially coal prices in Germany should exceed Dutch fuel prices by some 
constant because of transportation costs. 
39 Thomson Datastream is a commercial financial statistical database. 
40 This has the positive side-effect of significant reductions in weekly seasonalities. 
41 Datastream derives the daily coal price notations by converting the monthly coal prices in dollars into Euros 
using the daily exchange rate. Thus, the increasing Dollar-Euro exchange rate limited the effect of rising coal 




As mentioned, electricity is generated by a variety of technologies. Since the differences of 
marginal costs of power plants with the same technology are small compared to the cost 
difference between dissimilar technologies, we can approximate the marginal cost curve of 
the entire electricity system via a stepwise function (see Figure 2).42











































In detail, we can model the electricity price at time t  as the marginal cost of the last required 
technology to meet demand. In the short run, the costs of a plant should correlate closely with 
its fuel and emission costs. Since the fuel efficiency of technologies changes rather slowly, 
fuel and emission costs are predominantly determined by the respective prices. Thus, we can 
create a time series model that endogenously infers the cost structures of each class of plant 
and deduces which is marginal at each point in time using only the inputs of fuel, emission 
and electricity prices.  
 
                                                 
42 Typical non-dispatchable, must-run generation includes wind, run-of-river hydro and combined heat and 
power plants (in winter). 
43 The error term might be positive or negative. Consequently the marginal cost might in some cases be lower 
(base and coal in the stylized representation) or higher (gas and spike in the stylized representation) than the sum 
of fuel, emission and other variable cost. 
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Generally, our model consists of two procedures: a routine that decides which class of power 
plants sets the price (i.e., is marginal) and a mechanism that reproduces the electricity price 
formation for each class. For each technology regime44 1,2,...,mSt =  we assume the marginal 
costs at time T1t ∈  to be the sum of a state dependent stochastic component and a state 
dependent weighted linear combination of the k explanatory variables. That is, the weighting 
vector β  depends on the marginal technology in time t . Thus, the weighting vector specific 
for the technology state i   (i.e., the vector that applies for all t  where iSt = ) is denoted iβ . 
The state dependent stochastic component in time t  for the technology state i  is denoted it ,ε . 
The set of explanatory variables stored in the k  rows of the matrix TX :1  may contain, for 































 Depending on the chosen explanatory variables and the 
technologies, the model can be written as  
 
      (1) 
 
When the process that determines the marginal technology at time t  is assumed to be 
Markovian46 it ,ε and  is assumed to be independent and identically normal distributed in each 
technology state i , (1) can be estimated using a Markov Switching Regression. We first 
convert the model into state space form with the states (or regimes) representing the different 
technologies. To make the model computable, we specify the transition matrix 
as ( ) jitt pjSiSProb ,1| === − , i.e. with time invariant exogenous switching probabilities.47
                                                 
44 The terms state, regime, technology and technology regime are used synonymously. 
45 The notion 
  
T:1 , here and in the remainder of the chapter, refers to the corresponding element at all discrete 
time points between 1=t  and Tt = . 
46 A Markov process is characterized by the fact that the likelihood of a given future state, at any given moment, 
depends only on its present state, and not on any past states. 
47 Including demand and weather conditions in the switching probabilities could improve the estimation; 
modeling switching cost as threshold variables in the state-equation may make the estimates even more realistic. 
However, the problematic implementation is left to further research. 
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Thus, the model is fully described by  
tt SttS
el
t Xprice ,εβ +×=          (2a) 
mSt ...1=           (2b) 
( ) mjipjSiSProb jitt ≤≤∀=== − ,1,| ,1      (3) 
where tX  is the 
tht  column of the ( Tk × ) matrix TX :1  of explanatory variables and tSβ is the 
state dependent ( k×1 ) row vector ( kSSS ttt ,2,1, ,..., βββ , where kSt ,β  is the coefficient for the 
thk explanatory variable).  
 
The presented stylized merit order (see Figure 2) implies that there are only four types of 
power plants with different cost structures.48
tS
β
 The marginal cost for each technology depends 
only on the fuel consumption, emissions and non-fuel variable costs. Thus, the explanatory 
variables are: a constant, the coal price, the gas price and the emission allowance price. We 
can impose certain zero restrictions on  because the marginal cost of coal plants should not 
depend on the gas price. The interpretation of the remaining coefficients is then 
straightforward. The constant represents the non-fuel variable cost of this type of plant. The 
fuel coefficient for the used fuel is the inverse of the heat rate of the plant (when electricity 
price and fuel price are both measured in the same unit, i.e. €/MWh). The coefficient for the 
emission certificate prices represents the amount of emissions per unit of electricity.49
Our non-linear model makes it difficult to deduce theoretically the distribution of the 
parameters conditioned on the data. Thus, we rely on the approach by Schweri (2004) who 
proposes to address this issue by using the Gibbs sampling technique.
 When 
interpreting the results, we must bear in mind that we do not address the endogeneity problem 
(i.e. we ignore the reality that gas and emission allowance prices also depend on electricity 
prices) and the number of states selection problem (i.e. we ignore that the “real” number of 
states might be different from our choice). 
 
50
                                                 
48 Must-run generation like wind and run-of-river hydro are not included since they can be considered as a 
reduction of net electricity demand. 
49 The units match accordingly: €/MWhel = €/MWhel+MWhel/MWhth×€/MWhth+tCO2/MWhel×€/tCO2 
50 See Krolzig (1997, p.148ff). 
 The general idea of 
Gibbs sampling is to repeatedly draw each parameter conditioned on the data and all other 
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parameters. This procedure is iterated many times, always conditioning on the latest draws of 
the other parameters. To estimate (2) and (3) via Gibbs sampling, the density function ( )•g  
has to be separated. Schweri (2004) proposes the following dissection:  
 
( )














    (4) 
 
According to the dissection in (4) the distribution of the parameters conditioned on the data 
can be deduced using the four steps proposed in Schweri (2004, p.34ff):  
1) Deduce ( )TelTT XpriceSg :1:1:1 ,|  from ( )TelTT XpriceSg :1:1 ,|  and ( )Telttt XpriceSSg :1:11 ,,| +  
by backward iteration. Thereby ( )Telttt XpriceSSg :1:11 ,,| +  is calculated 
from ( )Teltt XpriceSg :1:1 ,|  which is obtained by the Hamilton filter. 
2) Draw the beta-distributed switching probabilities jip ,  given TS :1 . 
3) Draw the 
TS
β  given elTprice :1 , TX :1 , TS :1  and tSσ . 




β , TS :1 , 
el
Tprice :1  and TX :1 . 
 
A detailed description of the steps and its technical implementation appears in Schweri (2004, 
p.33-54) who also provides the corresponding Matlab code.51
                                                 
51As the author was unable to find any other implementation of a Bayesian Markov Switching 
Vectorautoregression in the literature he had solely relied on the excellently documented Matlab code provided 
in the diploma thesis by Urs Schweri (2004). The methodology used in this chapter reproduces the regime 
switching model without Kalman Filtering of Schweri (2004, p.33-54). The author would like to thank Urs 




Table 4: Dimension and notation of variables used in the Markov-Switching Model 
Variable Dimension Explanation 
el
tprice  scalar Explained variable: electricity price series 
t  scalar time index 
tS  scalar Indicator of the regime in time t  
k  scalar number of explanatory variables 
m  scalar number of states 
T  scalar termination date 
jip ,  scalar probability to switch from state i  to state j . 
tX   1×k  vector of explanatory variables at time t  (constant, considered 
fuel and emission price series) 
tS
β  k×1  state dependent coefficient vector 
tSt ,
ε  scalar state dependent error term 
tS
σ  scalar state dependent error variance 
 
The described estimation strategy features certain drawbacks:  
(1) Due to the definition of prior expectations, that (might) drive the posterior distribution 
of the parameters, the results are not purely data driven (Schweri, 2004, p.29)  
(2) The assumptions on the distribution of error terms (independent, identical distributed) 
are not met for all time series (see Table 12). 
(3) The results might depend on the selection of starting values. 
(4) At small numbers of draws the results are not stable and there is no final certainty that 
the model converged to the global maximum. Thus, a high number of draws is chosen 
that make the estimation computationally burdensome.  
Despite these caveats, the presented estimation strategy was the approach the best suited 
to estimate the described model, the author was able to find in the literature. As discussed 
in Krolzig (1997, p.175) in contrast to the Expectation Maximization approach the Gibbs 
sampling approach provides the posterior distribution of the parameters. Furthermore, it 




II.4 Results  
(a) Estimation Results  
 
To estimate (2) & (3), a sensible choice of the dependent variable (i.e. the electricity price 
series) is crucial. As demand is highly volatile throughout the day, we may expect that up to 
five regime switches (nuclear->coal->gas->coal->nuclear) occur every day. Using a 
continuous hour-by-hour series is inadequate because regime persistency ( iip , >> jip , ) is 
required for stable estimates. Thus, it is preferable to divide the continuous series into 24 day-
by-day series, each of which represents one hour. However, we note that estimating (2) & (3) 
for 24 (or even 48) series is impractical because of the similarity of some series (e.g. 3rd and 
4th hour data), and the estimation procedure is computationally burdensome. We can reduce 
the series to two still retain most information by drawing on a weighted average of on-peak 
(8am-8pm) and off-peak (8pm-8am) prices. We obtain the optimal weighting vector (in terms 
of variance explained) by Principal Components Analysis (PCA).52 Later, we exclude dates 
with electricity prices above 200€/MWh because such extreme price spikes could distort our 
analysis and cannot be explained by fuel cost fundamentals.53
We estimate (2) & (3) for the off-peak and on-peak series for the German (EEX) and the 
British (UKPX) markets. In all four cases (EEX off-peak, EEX on-peak, UKPX off-peak and 
UKPX on-peak), we apply a model in which spot electricity prices are explained by spot gas 
prices, spot coal prices and the respective emission allowance price. We omit oil prices and a 
trend after our initial estimations have suggested that they are not significant for any state. 




                                                 
52 Principal Component Analysis was developed to find those linear combinations of the elements of the columns 
of a data matrix that explain the majority of the variance of the data. A standardized linear combination is a 
weighted average (
 To capture the effect that 
X'δ ) of the columns of X  where δ  is a vector of length one. Maximizing the variance of 
X'δ  leads to the choice 1γδ = , the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue 1λ  of the Covariance 
Matrix. This is a projection of X  into the one-dimensional space, where the components of X  are weighted by 
the elements of 1γ . )('11 µλ −= XY  is called the first PC. This projection can be generalized to the second, third, 
and pth PCs by using the second, third, and pth largest eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors. For the 
technical details see, for example, Haerdle and Simar (2003). 
53 Even burning expensive oil (50€/barrel) in an inefficient generator (heat rate of 20%) would only justify 
marginal cost of ~ 150€/MWhel (0.625 barrel/MWhth x 5 MWhth/MWhel x 50 €/barrel). For the modeling of 
electricity price spikes, see Lang and Schwarz (2007). 
54 Note that state dependent variance is straightforward since high electricity price regimes are characterized by 
higher variance. 
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switching from one marginal technology to another only occurs when demand or supply 
conditions change significantly, we predefine some persistency.55
Choosing the number of states is based on goodness-of-fit; interpretability with respect to the 
stylized merit order; and comparability. We measure goodness-of-fit using the Schwartz 
information criterion, which suggests that either three or four regimes are appropriate, 




Table 5: Results of the switching regression with 
 The assumed stylized merit order suggests that there are three 
regimes in off-peak (base, coal, gas) and three regimes in on-peak (coal, gas, spike). For ease 





freq βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean σ² 
Germany on-peak (R²=75%) 
State1  35% 12.5 (+/-7.0) -1.27 (+/-1.23) 1.60 (+/-.40) 1.12 (+/-.17) 35.0 60 
State2 44% 18.8 (+/-5.0) -1.04 (+/-0.69) 2.06 (+/-.29) 1.32 (+/-.12) 44.1 40 
State3 22% 28.6 (+/-11.5) 2.41 (+/-3.09) 0.75 (+/-.82) 2.15 (+/-.58) 78.0 790 
Germany off-peak (R²=92%) 
State1 „Coal“ 38% -1.0 (+/-4.0) 2.02 (+/-0.62) 0.60 (+/-.14) 0.66 (+/-.07) 24.0 19 
State2 „Coal“ 40% 3.4 (+/-3.5) 1.63 (+/-0.59) 0.96 (+/-.10) 0.66 (+/-.06) 30.0 8 
State3 „Gas“ 21% 15.9 (+/-7.1) -0.03 (+/-1.28) 1.11 (+/-.27) 0.82 (+/-.15) 38.5 18 
UK on-peak (R²=90%) 
State1 „Coal“ 47% 2.7 (+/-1.7) 2.13 (+/-.35) 1.05 (+/-.13) 0.98 (+/-.06) 30.0 10 
State2 „Mix“ 40% 10.6 (+/-5.1) 1.47 (+/-.81) 1.42 (+/-.24) 0.91 (+/-.14) 46.1 37 
State3 „Gas“ 13% 24.5 (+/-14.5) 1.29 (+/-2.91) 1.85 (+/-.26) 0.80 (+/-.44) 93.7 434 
UK off-peak (R²=94%) 
State1 „Mix“ 63% 3.0 (+/-1.6) 1.67 (+/-0.22) 0.89 (+/-.09) 0.77 (+/-.03) 28.9 4 
State2 „Coal“ 26% 6.2 (+/-2.7) 2.38 (+/-0.40) 0.27 (+/-.14) 1.16 (+/-.06) 26.8 2 
State3 „Mix“ 11% 12.9 (+/-9.3) 0.84 (+/-1.53) 0.82 (+/-.14) 0.78 (+/-.23) 56.3 83 
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold empirical parameters are significantly 
different from zero.  




                                                 
55 The probability of remaining in the current state was set to 0.67 whereas the probability of switching to 
another state was adjusted to 0.16. Giving the prior a modest variance of approximately 0.1 implies that the beta-
distribution of the pij - values is set to u1 = 2 and u2 = 1 on the main diagonal and u1 = 1 and u2 = 6 beyond the 
main diagonal. 
56 The Schwartz Information Criterion has been calculated for each case for one to four regimes using a model 
specification with non-informative priors for the entire sample. While the Schwartz Information Criterion favors 
a three-regime specification for the UK off-peak case, a four-regime specification is preferred for all other cases. 
This reflects the higher diversity of the German off-peak generation structure and must be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
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The model is first estimated imposing (almost) no prior information on the parameters, 
switching probabilities and variances. Therefore, prior mean and starting values of the model 
parameters are set according to Table 10 (see Appendix). The estimation results for the three-
state model with non-informative priors (see Table 5) suggest that the regime-switching 
model adequately captures the electricity prices. First, the R2 is above 90% for all but the 
German on-peak series (75%). Second, the model performs significantly better than the 
single- state model. Third, almost all empirical parameters are significantly different from 
zero. Further, some states can be plausibly interpreted as technology regimes; e.g. the second 
state in the UK off-peak model could plausibly represent coal power plants (CPP). The coal 
coefficient (2.4) is close to the inverse heat rate of a CPP (~2.3-3.0), the CO2 coefficient (1.2) 
is close to the emission rate of a CPP (~0.85) and the gas coefficient (0.3) is significant but 
small. Despite this evidence, in other respects the model with non-informative prior’s deviates 
markedly from the assumed stylized merit order as certain states overlap57
Using informative priors, it is possible to induce model outcomes that are plausible with 
respect to the stylized merit order. In all four cases (EEX off-peak, EEX on-peak, UKPX off-
peak and UKPX on-peak), certain parameters are constrained to zero by applying tight prior 
distributions with mean zero.
 and cannot clearly 





 Setting the mean and variance for the prior distribution of the 
parameters as well as the starting values according to  (see Appendix), the model is 
estimated using the described procedure.59
                                                 
57 In three of the four cases, the coefficients of at least two regimes cannot clearly be distinguished because the 
95% confidence intervals for all of their coefficients overlap. This occurs for Germany peak (State1~State2); UK 
peak (State2~State3); and UK off-peak (State1~State3). 
58 In each of the steps, the posterior distribution p(θ|y) is given by the likelihood function L(θ|y) times the prior 
distribution g(θ): p(θ|y)= g(θ) × L(θ|y). 
59 Due to the identification restriction, the sorting of the no-fuel state is crucial. Setting it as the first state implies 
that it has the lowest constant of all states, resulting in a baseload state. 
 This selection ensures that in each case three 
technology regimes (off-peak: base, coal and gas; on-peak: coal, gas and spike) exist that can 
be clearly distinguished. The coal and gas price parameter priors, for example, imply that each 
fuel is only significant in the corresponding regime. 
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Figure 3: Posterior parameter density for the UK off-peak case (informative priors) 







































































































The estimation results (see Table 6) indicate a good fit and the estimated regime 
characteristics allow us to make a straightforward interpretation. First, each state can 
meaningfully be attributed to a unique technology. Second, the average electricity prices in 
each regime are sorted according to the presented stylized merit order. Third, the estimated 
parameters are in an intuitive order of magnitude. In all four cases, we note that the coal 
coefficient in the coal state is always larger than the gas coefficient in the gas state, and the 
emissions allowance price has a stronger influence on the coal state. Fourth, almost all 
posterior parameter densities have a single maximum and are approximately normally 
distributed. This is illustrated at the UK off-peak example in Figure 3 where only the emission 
allowance posterior has two maxima.60
The four technology regimes (base, coal, gas and spike) each feature unique characteristics. In 
the base regime electricity prices depend modestly on both fuel prices and emission allowance 
prices. Whether the gas and coal price dependence can be explained by ramping and 
balancing costs that figure into the marginal cost of typical baseload plants (nuclear, wind, 
lignite) or whether the dependence is due to endogeneity (e.g., baseload electricity as a 
 This indicates that the model is generally well 
specified but that potentially two different coal states (e.g., “new” and “old”) with different 
emission intensities may exist. 
 
                                                 
60 The results for all other cases may be obtained from the author upon request. 
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substitute for coal and gas) cannot be determined. Interestingly, the base state is the dominant 
state in the UK (80%) but not in Germany (38%). The coal states in all four cases feature 
highly significant influences of coal prices (1.57-4.10), insignificant influences of gas prices 
and highly significant influences of emission allowance prices (0.94-1.63). The average 
electricity prices in the coal state vary between around 40 in the UK off-peak and 30 in all 
other cases. In the gas state, all but the coal price coefficients are significantly positive. The 
gas price coefficients vary between 0.79 and 1.87, and the emission allowance price 
coefficients between 0.87 and 1.37. Finally the spike state is characterized by high prices, 
high variance and low frequency. 
 
Table 6: Results of the switching regression with informative
 
 priors 
freq βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean σ² 
Germany on-peak (R²=80%)  
State1 “Coal 30% 7.4 (+/-4.6) 2.00 (+/-.92) 0.00 (+/-.02) 1.63 (+/-.13) 33.4 73 
State2 “Gas” 57% 14.7 (+/-3.5) 0.00 (+/-.02) 1.87 (+/-.26) 1.37 (+/-.14) 44.6 62 
State3 “Spike” 13% 91.9 (+/-6.1) -0.41 (+/-.61) -0.18 (+/-.43) 0.93 (+/-.43) 97.1 800 
Germany off-peak (R²=90%)  
State1 “Base” 38% 6.8 (+/-2.9) 1.11 (+/-.43) 0.35 (+/-.28) 0.76 (+/-.13) 22.8 19 
State2 “Coal” 34% 13.7 (+/-2.8) 1.57 (+/-.54) 0.01 (+/-.02) 0.94 (+/-.16) 29.5 9 
State3 “Gas” 28% 19.8 (+/-1.9) 0.00 (+/-.02) 0.71 (+/-.13) 0.94 (+/-.11) 38.6 20 
UK on-peak (R²=87%)  
State1 “Coal” 37% 2.6 (+/-1.5) 4.10 (+/-.27) 0.01 (+/-.02) 1.19 (+/-.07) 29.6 9 
State2 “Gas” 53% 13.2 (+/-2.4) 0.00 (+/-.02) 1.79 (+/-.20) 0.87 (+/-.12) 45.1 59 
State3 “Spike” 10% 89.2 (+/-6.2) -0.59 (+/-.63) 0.98 (+/-.30) -0.30 (+/-.45) 103.6 710 
UK off-peak (R²=95%)  
State1 “Base” 80% 4.3 (+/-.9) 1.59 (+/-.17) 0.82 (+/-.09) 0.77 (+/-.03) 26.9 3 
State2 “Coal” 11% 9.2 (+/-4.5) 2.72 (+/-.62) 0.01 (+/-.02) 1.08 (+/-.17) 39.4 6 
State3 “Gas” 9% 16.4 (+/-4.0) 0.00 (+/-.02) 0.83 (+/-.14) 0.87 (+/-.28) 62.2 83 
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold empirical parameters are significantly 
different from zero. 
 
This being said, we note some reservations. First, it is difficult to explain that despite the 
straightforward identification of technology regimes, the cost structures of the technologies 
are unstable across countries and load periods. In fact, the 95% confidence intervals for the 
same coefficient in the same regime often do not intersect. For example, the confidence 
interval of the gas price coefficient in the gas regime for the German on-peak (1.87+/-.26) 
does not intersect with the same interval for the German off-peak (0.71+/-.13). Second, some 
coefficients are far “off” their expected values. For example, the inverse heat rate of a gas- 
fired plant should be somewhere around 2.5, but the estimated values are significantly 
smaller. Third, the assumption of normality for the residuals must be rejected for eight of the 
twelve cases at the five percent significance level (see Table 12 in the Appendix). 
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There are two potential explanations for the deviations of the estimation results from 
expectations: either the model is misspecified with respect to the real marginal cost of 
electricity production, and/or the underlying assumption that electricity prices are based on 
marginal cost is incorrect. While the first explanation probably holds to some degree,61
Figure 4: Regime probabilities for the UK off-peak case (informative priors) 
 there 
are reasons to believe that the second explanation is also plausible. Since the cost structure of 
a national power generation system is rather stable, intertemporal and international 
comparison of the model outcomes allows us to track the differences in the deviations of 
electricity prices from marginal cost. 
 



































                                                 
61 One cannot expect that a stochastic model with a very parsimonious specification can completely track the 
marginal cost of a complex electricity system. It is likely that increasing the number of technologies (i.e., states) 
and including more data (e.g. demand) could improve the outcomes. 
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(b) Intertemporal and international comparison of price formation  
 
The first fact that merits attention is that the goodness-of-fit of our model is better in the UK 
case in both load periods (see Table 7). Using the Wilcoxon rank sum test62
This is strong indication that the regime switching model captures the UK electricity price 
development better than the German electricity price development. Several factors may be 
responsible for this: First, electricity generation in the UK relies more on the two modeled 
fuels (72% in the UK vs. 34% in Germany); estimations suggest that more than the considered 
three technology regimes are present in the German market. Second, both the UK natural gas 
and electricity markets feature a stronger link via common demand drivers and substitution 
than the Dutch natural gas and the German electricity markets.
, we find that the 
median absolute errors are significantly larger in the German case. Second, the constant is 
smaller and the fuel price coefficients are generally larger in the corresponding UK cases, 
indicating that fuel cost impacts a higher percentage of the UK’s electricity prices. 
Furthermore, the posterior parameter variance is generally smaller in the UK.  
 
63 Third, Germany is more 
fully integrated in the European electricity market, leading to a stronger influence of “foreign” 
power and fuel prices that are not considered in the stylized model.64
                                                 
62 For details on the Wilcoxon rank sum test see Freund and Wilson (2002, p.588ff). 
63 Note also that the feedback effects of the UK electricity price on the UK gas price may play a role. Knowing 
that the UK natural gas market is more mature and natural gas prices are less linked to the oil price than in 
Germany, it could very well be that endogeneity UK > endogeneity Germany. 
 Fourth, the UKPX price 
may include more information because the gate closure in the UK is only one hour ahead of 
schedule (in Germany it is at 12 a.m. on the day before delivery). Fifth, German electricity 
prices must reflect the higher added costs for reliability under stochastic wind- and heat-
guided Combined Heat and Power plant (CHP) electricity production since these technologies 
comprise a substantial share of the fuel mix in Germany, unlike the UK. Sixth, the start-up 
cost and cost of reserve capacity are more important in an electricity system that is based 
largely on coal and lignite units. Since our model does not consider these cost types, the price-
cost difference is potentially overestimated in the German market. Finally, the UK market is 
considered to be more competitive, potentially leading to more short-term, cost-dependent 
electricity prices. 
64 The UK electricity system is connected to the continental system via the Anglo-French electricity 
interconnector only (see Chapter V), while Germany has direct transmission lines to eight of its nine neighboring 
countries and Sweden. These physical characteristics are mirrored in the price developments (see Figure 10 on 
p.54). 
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Table 7: Goodness-of-fit (R²) of the regime switching model with informative priors 
 Germany UK Wilcoxon rank sum test results65 
on-peak 80% 87% 1,634,055*** 
off-peak 90% 95% 969,195*** 
 
The intertemporal comparison is also of interest. Estimating the model for the two sub-
samples, 2002-2004 and 2005-2006, we find that the constants rose significantly from the 
earlier to the later stage (see Table 8). Consequently, a significant proportion of the electricity 
price increases in both the UK and Germany were not driven by fuel and emission cost 
increases. This can be attributed to two factors: first, it has been argued that in the sample 
period, electricity pricing switched from over-capacity-driven, short-term marginal cost 
(SRMC) pricing after liberalization to a less fuel-cost-dependent, long-term marginal cost 
pricing. This switching has been attributed to the reduction of excess capacities during the 
process of liberalization. A second explanation is that increasing concentration in the 
wholesale sector made exercising market power potentially easier.  
 
Table 8: Regime-dependent constant in the early (2002-04) and late (2005-06) sub-sample 
 Germany off-peak Germany on-peak UK off-peak UK on-peak 
State 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2002-04 5.5 14.2 17.8 4.6 9.3 17.1 8 13.1 86.8 2 12.3 90.7 
2005-06 11.6 13.6 19.8 11.3 13.9 17 7.4 15.4 101.5 5.6 10.9 96.3 
 
Figure 3 depicts the marginal state for every point in time as estimated in the model with 
informative priors for the UK off-peak case. What is striking about this example is that the 
dominance of the base regime ceased in the second half of 2005 while the coal and gas regime 
gained importance. This structural change (found in all four cases) may have been due to a 
fuel switch caused by high emission certificate prices or lower baseload generation margins 
produced by increasing baseload demand and/or decreasing baseload generation capacities. 
 
                                                 
65 We test the null hypothesis that the median of the absolute value of the residuals for the German and the 
British model are identical. The three stars indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected on the 99% significance 
interval. 
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II.5 Conclusion  
 
The chapter compares the wholesale price formation mechanism in the UK and Germany. 
Applying a Markov Switching Regression, we provide indication that the wholesale prices in 
the UK correlate more closely to the prices of coal, gas and emission allowances than their 
German counterparts. The differences in the German and UK price formation mechanism 
point to the insufficient integration of these markets. We also show that the frequency at 
which high-price fuels become marginal increases in both countries. Given that demand did 
not increase significantly in the sample period, we interpret the finding as a leftward shift of 
the supply function, indicating a reduction in available, less costly production capacities. We 
provide indication that non-fuel-based coefficients can explain some of the electricity price 
increases observed. These findings are in line with conjectures that the initially strong link 
between short-term marginal cost and prices gradually vanishes due to decreasing generation 
margins or increasing exercise of market power. Although more research is needed, our new 
approach to modeling wholesale prices based on fuel and emission prices proves useful in 
understanding the nonlinear nature of electricity price formation. 
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II.6 Appendix  
Table 9: Result of the ordinary least square model for the electricity price 








 beta std beta std beta std beta std 
βconst 3.26 0.74 4.43 2.06 5.05 1.18 20.35 3.43         
βcoal 1.71 0.13 0.61 0.35 0.82 0.19 -2.51 0.56 
βgas 0.88 0.02 2.17 0.05 1.14 0.05 2.55 0.15 
βC02 0.82 0.02 0.93 0.05 0.57 0.03 1.14 0.08 
Bold coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 10: Prior mean and starting values of the model with non-informative priors 
 State 1 State 2 State 3 
βconst 5 10 15 
βcoal 1 1 1 
βgas 1 1 1 
βC02 1 1 1 
 
Table 11: Prior mean (prior variance) and starting values of the model with informative priors 
 off-peak on-peak 
 Base Coal Natural Gas Coal Natural Gas Spike 
βconst 5 (10) 10 (10) 15 (10) 5 (10) 10 (10) 100 (10) 
βcoal 0 (0.1) 3 (1) 0 (0.0001) 3 (1) 0 (0.0001) 0 (0. 1) 
βgas 0 (0.1) 0 (0.0001) 2 (1) 0 (0.0001) 2 (1) 0 (0. 1) 
βC02 0 (0.1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (1) 
 
Table 12: Jarque-Bera Test statistics for the normality of the residuals 
 State 1 State 2 State 3 
German on-peak 38.24** 42.65 * 38.97** 
German off-peak 44.83** 0.49 [] 74.73** 
UK on-peak 7.87** 27.96 * 11.94** 
UK off-peak 11.89** 1.89 [] 4.73** 
German on-peak (non-info. priors) 16.72** 17.66** 72.29 * 
German off-peak (non-info. priors) 84.6** 1.18 [] 53.17** 
UK on-peak (non-info. priors) 8.25** 6.97** 30.43** 
UK off-peak (non-info. priors) 16.35** 3.92 [] 2.81 [] 
*,**,*** The null hypothesis of residuals normality can be rejected at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance 
levels. [] The null cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. 
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Table 13: Results of the switching regression for German on-peak 
 freq βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean 
2002-2006 (R²=80%) 
State1 (“Coal) 0.30 7.4 (+/-4.6) 2 (+/-0.92) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.63 (+/-0.13) 33.42 
State2 (“Gas”) 0.57 14.7 (+/-3.5) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.87 (+/-0.26) 1.37 (+/-0.14) 44.64 
State3 (“Spike”) 0.13 91.9 (+/-6.1) -.41 (+/-0.61) -0.18 (+/-0.43) 0.93 (+/-0.43) 97.05 
2002-2004 (R²=56%) 
State1 (“Coal) 0.24 8 (+/-4.7) 1.73 (+/-0.9) 0 (+/-0.02) 0 (+/-0) 16.92 
State2 (“Gas”) 0.66 13.1 (+/-3.5) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.93 (+/-0.29) 0 (+/-0) 34.32 
State3 (“Spike”) 0.10 86.8 (+/-5.9) -.59 (+/-0.62) -1.35 (+/-0.6) 0 (+/-0) 60.14 
2005-2006 (R²=71%) 
State1 (“Coal) 0.41 7.4 (+/-5.2) 3.79 (+/-1) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.15 (+/-0.21) 51.53 
State2 (“Gas”) 0.45 15.4 (+/-5.4) 0 (+/-0.02) 2.38 (+/-0.4) 0.97 (+/-0.34) 73.98 
State3 (“Spike”) 0.15 101.5 (+/-6) 0.08 (+/-0.6) 0.24 (+/-0.42) 0.31 (+/-0.45) 119.97 
2002-2006 non-informative priors (R²=75%) 
State1 0.35 12.5 (+/-7) -1.27 (+/-1.2) 1.6 (+/-0.4) 1.12 (+/-0.17) 34.96 
State2 0.44 18.8 (+/-5) -1.04 (+/-.69) 2.06 (+/-0.29) 1.32 (+/-0.12) 44.06 
State3 0.22 28.6 (+/-11) 2.41 (+/-3.09) 0.75 (+/-0.82) 2.15 (+/-0.58) 77.93 
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Table 14: Results of the switching regression for German off-peak 
 freq βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean 
2002-2006 (R²=90%) 
State1 (“Base) 0.38 6.8 (+/-2.9) 1.11 (+/-0.43) 0.35 (+/-0.28) 0.76 (+/-0.13) 22.80 
State2 (“Coal”) 0.34 13.7 (+/-2.8) 1.57 (+/-0.54) 0.01 (+/-0.02) 0.94 (+/-0.16) 29.52 
State3 (“Gas”) 0.28 19.8 (+/-1.9) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.71 (+/-0.13) 0.94 (+/-0.11) 38.60 
2002-2004 (R²=75%) 
State1 (“Base) 0.42 5.5 (+/-3.1) 1.11 (+/-0.41) 0.48 (+/-0.29) 0 (+/-0) 16.28 
State2 (“Coal”) 0.29 14.2 (+/-2.3) 1.44 (+/-0.45) 0 (+/-0.02) 0 (+/-0) 22.14 
State3 (“Gas”) 0.29 17.8 (+/-3) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.9 (+/-0.25) 0 (+/-0) 28.86 
2005-2006 (R²=78%) 
State1 (“Base) 0.39 11.6 (+/-3.6) 0.66 (+/-0.54) 0.44 (+/-0.24) 0.59 (+/-0.16) 33.72 
State2 (“Coal”) 0.31 13.6 (+/-3.8) 2.51 (+/-0.77) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.62 (+/-0.19) 39.31 
State3 (“Gas”) 0.30 19.8 (+/-5) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.71 (+/-0.23) 0.87 (+/-0.2) 51.72 
2002-2006 non-informative priors (R²=92%) 
State1 0.38 -1 (+/-4) 2.02 (+/-0.62) 0.6 (+/-0.14) 0.66 (+/-0.07) 23.95 
State2 0.40 3.4 (+/-3.5) 1.63 (+/-0.59) 0.96 (+/-0.1) 0.66 (+/-0.06) 29.96 
State3 0.21 15.9 (+/-7.1) -.03 (+/-1.28) 1.11 (+/-0.27) 0.82 (+/-0.15) 38.46 
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. 
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Table 15: Results of the switching regression for UK on-peak 
 freq βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean 
2002-2006 (R²=87%) 
State1 (“Coal) 0.37 2.6 (+/-1.5) 4.1 (+/-0.27) 0.01 (+/-0.02) 1.19 (+/-0.07) 29.55 
State2 (“Gas”) 0.53 13.2 (+/-2.4) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.79 (+/-0.2) 0.87 (+/-0.12) 45.12 
State3 (“Spike”) 0.10 89.2 (+/-6.2) -.59 (+/-0.63) 0.98 (+/-0.3) -0.3 (+/-0.45) 103.64 
2002-2004 (R²=67%) 
State1 (“Coal) 0.46 2 (+/-1.6) 4.2 (+/-0.28) 0 (+/-0.02) 0 (+/-0) 25.29 
State2 (“Gas”) 0.51 12.3 (+/-2.5) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.81 (+/-0.23) 0 (+/-0) 32.19 
State3 (“Spike”) 0.03 90.7 (+/-6.9) -.52 (+/-0.61) -0.89 (+/-0.68) 0 (+/-0) 65.99 
2005-2006 (R²=80%) 
State1 (“Coal) 0.22 5.6 (+/-5.4) 3.26 (+/-1.14) 0 (+/-0.02) 1.86 (+/-0.53) 54.71 
State2 (“Gas”) 0.61 10.9 (+/-4.5) 0 (+/-0.02) 2.36 (+/-0.42) 0.38 (+/-0.35) 61.29 
State3 (“Spike”) 0.17 96.3 (+/-6.4) -0.24 (+/-0.6) 0.84 (+/-0.4) -.38 (+/-0.55) 113.55 
2002-2006 non-informative priors (R²=90%) 
State1 0.47 2.7 (+/-1.7) 2.13 (+/-0.35) 1.05 (+/-0.13) 0.98 (+/-0.06) 29.95 
State2 0.40 10.6 (+/-5.1) 1.47 (+/-0.81) 1.42 (+/-0.24) 0.91 (+/-0.14) 46.11 
State3 0.13 24.5 (+/-14) 1.29 (+/-2.91) 1.85 (+/-0.26) 0.8 (+/-0.44) 93.72 
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Table 16: Results of the switching regression for UK off-peak 
 freq βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean 
2002-2006 (R²=95%) 
State1 (“Base) 0.80 4.3 (+/-0.9) 1.59 (+/-0.17) 0.82 (+/-0.09) 0.77 (+/-0.03) 26.87 
State2 (“Coal”) 0.11 9.2 (+/-4.5) 2.72 (+/-0.62) 0.01 (+/-0.02) 1.08 (+/-0.17) 39.37 
State3 (“Gas”) 0.09 16.4 (+/-4) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.83 (+/-0.14) 0.87 (+/-0.28) 62.15 
2002-2004 (R²=84%) 
State1 (“Base) 0.81 4.6 (+/-1.4) 1.61 (+/-0.17) 0.75 (+/-0.14) 0 (+/-0) 20.85 
State2 (“Coal”) 0.05 9.3 (+/-5) 2.75 (+/-0.7) 0 (+/-0.02) 0 (+/-0) 29.36 
State3 (“Gas”) 0.14 17.1 (+/-6.1) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.78 (+/-0.58) 0 (+/-0) 25.84 
2005-2006 (R²=85%) 
State1 (“Base) 0.56 11.3 (+/-3) 0.34 (+/-0.46) 0.81 (+/-0.16) 0.88 (+/-0.06) 40.59 
State2 (“Coal”) 0.21 13.9 (+/-3.5) 3.11 (+/-0.84) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.45 (+/-0.17) 41.73 
State3 (“Gas”) 0.23 17 (+/-4) 0 (+/-0.02) 0.81 (+/-0.15) 0.81 (+/-0.29) 62.89 
2002-2006 non-informative priors (R²=94%) 
State1 0.63 3 (+/-1.6) 1.67 (+/-0.22) 0.89 (+/-0.09) 0.77 (+/-0.03) 28.92 
State2 0.26 6.2 (+/-2.7) 2.38 (+/-0.4) 0.27 (+/-0.14) 1.16 (+/-0.06) 26.84 
State3 0.11 12.9 (+/-9.3) 0.84 (+/-1.53) 0.82 (+/-0.14) 0.78 (+/-0.23) 56.31 
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold coefficients are significantly 




III  Asymmetric Pass-Through of EU Emissions Allowance Prices 
to German Wholesale Electricity Prices 
III.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the first application of the “rockets and feathers” literature on 
asymmetric cost pass-through between carbon dioxide (CO2)-emission prices and wholesale 
electricity prices. The literature distinguishes between two variations of asymmetric pricing: 
In short-term asymmetric pricing, positive and negative cost shocks are diffused at speeds that 
differ from the product prices (“Rockets and Feathers”) but that lead to symmetric, long-term 
relations between prices and cost (timing effect). In long-term asymmetric pricing, a positive 
cost shock has a different long-term impact on final prices than a negative cost shock 
(magnitude effect).66
Asymmetric pricing has been intensively investigated in the input-to-output price pass-
through literature, especially the link between oil and gasoline prices.
  
 
67 Other industrial and 
agricultural products as well as services (banking) also feature the same phenomenon.68 Most 
empirical papers contend that positive cost shocks are disseminated more strongly and/or 
more rapidly to the final prices than negative cost shocks. These explanations posit either the 
exercise of market power or industry-specific factors. Bailey and Brorsen (1989, p.247) 
consider firms facing a (concave or convex) kinked demand curve that leads to (negative or 
positive) asymmetric pricing. Borenstein et al. (1997) suggest three hypotheses to explain 
their finding of short-term asymmetric pricing in the gasoline market: (1) a model of tacit 
collusion with imperfect monitoring,69
                                                 
66 Note that by definition long-term asymmetric pricing implies the short-term version. This is evident as 
asymmetries in the long run can only occur if there are asymmetries in the short run. 
67 In this area a battery of tests has been proposed and applied. See Geweke (2004), Manera and Frey (2005) and 
Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) for a survey of the asymmetric gasoline pricing literature. 
68 See Peltzman (2000). 
69 Borenstein et al. (1997) assume that the old gasoline prices offer a natural focal point for retailers if cost 
decreases (firms will maintain prices above the competitive level as long as their sales remain above a threshold 
level), while cost increases would immediately “squeeze” the margin and are therefore passed through to 
consumers. 
 (2) a model with finite inventories, and (3) a model of 
consumer search cost. Balke et al. (1998) consider oligopolistic firms that engage in tacit 
collusion to maintain higher profits where asymmetric pricing occurs as an effect of signaling: 
input price increases are instantaneously matched by output price increases to signal to 
competitors that collusion will be maintained. However, if input prices fall, firms will wait to 
lower output prices to avoid signaling an undermining of the unspoken agreement. Balke et al. 
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(1998) show that accounting methods such as “first in first out” can lead to asymmetric 
pricing. Asymmetric menu cost could also induce asymmetric pricing.70
In 2003 the European Union issued the Directive on the implementation of a European 
Emission Trading System (EU ETS)
 As the mentioned 
industry specific explanations (search cost, menu cost, accounting of inventories) do not apply 
in electricity futures markets, the dissemination patterns of positive and negative cost shocks 
are an insightful indicator of the functioning and efficiency of markets. 
 
Like gasoline prices, in the short-run electricity future prices are mainly driven by the volatile 
prices of its production inputs. Therefore, the presence of asymmetric cost pass-through in 
electricity future markets can be easily tested for different cost components. We are aware of 
anecdotal evidence that wholesale prices occasionally reacted more to EUA price increases 
than to decreases. For example, a 60% drop in EUA prices in the last week of April 2006 was 
only met by an 8% decline in power prices (EEX 2007 Futures). In this chapter we thus 
inquire the case of asymmetric cost pass-through of EUAs to electricity futures prices by 
applying the methodology from the aforementioned literature.  
 
71 to fulfill its Kyoto commitment of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from 1990 to 2012 by 8%. This “cap and trading” schema started its mandatory 
three-year trial phase with the beginning of 2005. The basic idea is that emissions sources 
with low-cost reduction opportunities can over comply and sell their additional allowances to 
sources where reductions would be more costly. This leads to the lowest overall cost, or most 
economically efficient solution. In the first phase only CO2 and a range of large installations 
in six key industrial sectors72
                                                 
70 Cf. Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel (2004). 
71 Directive 2003/87/EC of October 13th 2003. 
72 The covered ~12,000 installations in these six sectors (electricity and heat production plants, oil refineries, 
coke ovens, metal ore and steel installations, cement kilns, glass manufacturing, ceramics manufacturing, and 
paper, pulp and board mills) currently make up for ~40% of the 25 EU countries CO2 emissions. 
 are concerned while with the beginning of 2008 also other 
greenhouse gases and at a later stage also additional sectors (possibly transportation) will be 
affected. The overall cap in the emissions trading scheme is made up of individual country 
caps set by each nation’s national allocation plan (NAP). The annually emitted EUAs are 
mainly transferable within each phase (“banking”). Despite concerns from economists most 
EUAs were allocated for free to the emitting installations (“grandfathering”). Nevertheless, 
their usage undoubtedly represents (opportunity) cost for the polluter as each EUA used could 
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not be sold at the market price. Therefore, it is not surprising to empirically find a positive 
link between EUA and power prices. Due to the different CO2-intensities of electricity 
production technologies, the influence of EUA prices on power prices is nonlinear.73
III.2 Data 
 Using 
2005 data, Sijm et al. (2006) estimated that emission costs have been almost fully (60-100%) 
passed through to consumers.  
 
This chapter applies an error correction and an autoregressive distributed lag model to identify 
asymmetric cost pass-through in the relationship between EUA and wholesale electricity 
prices. We reject the hypothesis of symmetric cost pass-through in favor of asymmetric 
pricing. We hope that our investigations will stimulate a discussion of empirical evidence and 
theoretical explanations of this phenomenon. 
 
 
In 2005 a total of 350 m tones of CO2 (worth around € 9 bn) were traded at the European 
Climate Exchange (London), various European electricity exchanges and OTC. This 
dissertation is mainly interested in the German market, and will therefore use the data 
provided by EEX. We opt to use data for the EUA spot market. We also obtained spot market 
electricity prices as well as prices for electricity futures with delivery in 2007 from EEX for 
the entire sample period (workdays of 2005-2006).74
                                                 
73 The emergence of CO2 as a cost factor in electricity prices complicates the analysis of the competitive supply 
curve (“merit order”). Fuels vary in emissions, e.g. nuclear (0 t/MWh), natural gas (0.48t/MWh) and coal 
(0.85t/MWh). Therefore, peak electricity prices (generally determined by a marginal combined cycle gas 
turbine) are likely to be less affected by CO2 prices than mid-load electricity prices (generally coal). See Chapter 
 
 
II for the non-linear relation of electricity and EUA prices. 
74 EEX prices are often considered as reference and usually track the more liquid OTC prices sufficiently well. 
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The EEX EUA spot prices as well as EEX electricity futures and spot prices for the years 
2005-2006 are depicted in Figure 5. The most outstanding event, the price crash in spring 
2006,75
                                                 
75 At the end of April 2006, information leaked to traders that some countries (Netherlands, Czech Republic, 
Walloon, Spain, France) emitted significantly less CO2 than expected. This created an overall long position in 
the market, causing EUA prices to drop from around €30 to €10. For details see CEAG (2006). 
 is highlighted by the dashed vertical line. Electricity futures and spot prices differ 
significantly in almost all statistical measures (e.g. mean, variance). The higher volatility of 
electricity spot prices results from the fact that they are based on more volatile drivers (e.g. 
weather, demand, and plant availability) and that electricity future prices capture a longer 
delivery period, smoothing the effects on individual supply and demand shocks. Since hourly 
demand and supply factors are less important for price formation in electricity futures 
markets, the main drivers are fuel and EUA prices. This is illustrated by the significantly 
higher correlation of EUA price changes with electricity futures than with electricity spot 
price changes. Daily EUA price changes feature no significant correlation with spot electricity 
price changes, but a correlation coefficient of .72*** with base electricity future 2007 price 
changes. Because of this structure, we limit our analysis to the EEX futures prices. 
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III.3 Methodology and Results 
(a) Error Correction Model 
 
Following Borenstein et al. (1997), we estimate the asymmetric diffusion pattern of positive 
and negative cost shocks using Error Correction Models (ECM).76
tttt COXTIMEEEX 23210 φφφφ +++=
 These models assume a 
long-term (symmetric) relation between prices and cost 
      (1) 
 but allow for short-term systematic deviations: 

































where tEEX  is the electricity price, tCO2  the EUA price, tGAS the natural gas price and 
tTIME  a linear time vector in time t. The period-to-period change in the electricity price is 
denoted by tEEX∆ , 
+∆ tCO2  is the positive period-to-period EUA price change (or zero 
if 02 <∆ tCO ), 
−∆ tCO2  the negative period-to-period EUA price change (or zero 
if 02 <∆ tCO ) and tGAS∆ is the period-to-period natural gas price change. Furthermore, tε  is 
an independent and identically-distributed error term. The coefficients 20 ,,,,, θφθφθλββ iii
−+  
and 3θφ  can be estimated using ordinary least squares. The idea of (2) is that changes in the 
electricity price are driven by changes in past electricity prices, current and past changes in 
EUA and natural gas prices as well as the error correction term that tends to bring the 
electricity price back to its long run equilibrium (if 0<θ ). That is, if the electricity price in t-
1 was above its equilibrium value, i.e., 02 13121101 >−−−− −−−− tttt COGASTIMEEEX φφφφ , the 
current change in electricity prices ( tEEX∆ ) should be smaller than indicated by the input 
price changes, bringing the electricity price closer to its equilibrium. 
                                                 
76 For details on the Error Correction Model see for example Greene (2002, p.654ff). 
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To reduce the number of variables (and because of a lack of significance), we delete the 
asymmetric reaction to past electricity prices suggested by Borenstein et al. (1997). The 
response of the electricity price in time kt +  to a one-time, 1%-positive CO2 price shock in t  
is according to Borenstein et al. (1997, p.337) given by 















1111 ˆˆˆ γφθβ .     (3) 
Because our sample length is limited (2 years), only a few specific combinations of lag length 
and data-frequency can be reasonably considered. Thus, we estimate equation (2) separately 
for weekly average base and peak futures prices using four lags in both cases. To control for 
gas price developments, we include Dutch TTF gas spot prices since there is no comparably 
liquid corresponding German market.77
                                                 
77 Since including time trend, constant, coal prices or load as well as controlling for the market crash in April 
2006 do not alter the asymmetry results significantly, we only present the results for the most parsimonious 
specification. Detailed results may be obtained from the author upon request. 
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Table 17: Error correction model results 
Variable Base Peak 
R2 (
2R ) 74% (69%) 63% (54%) 
2σ  0.48 0.86 
Durbin-Watson 1.92 1.94 
Engels ARCH78 3.17  (CV 5%=3.84) 2.05 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (CV 5%=0.13) 0.09 0.08 
0θφ (Constant) 1.33  1.17  
1θφ (Time Trend) 0.02 ** 0.03 ** 
+
0β  (dCO2+t) 0.14  0.09  
+
1β  (dCO2+t-1) 0.15  0.07  
+
2β  (dCO2+t-2) -0.17  -0.29 * 
+
3β  (dCO2+t-3) 0.49 *** 0.70 *** 
−
0β (dCO2-t) 0.02  0.05  
−
1β (dCO2-t-1) -0.17 * -0.19 *** 
−
2β (dCO2-t-2) 0.17 * 0.11  
−
3β (dCO2-t-3) 0.52 *** 0.42 *** 
1γ (dEEXt-1) -0.01  0.04  
2γ (dEEXt-2) -0.04  -0.09  
3γ (dEEXt-3) 0.10  0.16  
0λ (dGASt) -0.03  -0.03  
1λ (dGASt-1) 0.00  0.01  
2λ (dGASt-2) 0.02  0.02  
3λ (dGASt-3) 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 
θ  (EEXt-1) -0.09 ** -0.07 ** 
2θφ (CO2t-1) 0.05 * 0.07 * 
3θφ  (GASt-1) 0.04 *** 0.04 ** 
 F(H0: CO2sym vs. H1: CO2asym) 2.9 ** 1.9  
*,**,*** Coefficient different from zero on the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence 
intervals respectively. Weekly average 2005-2006 data (99 observations). 
 
The R2 above 60% and the Durbin-Watson statistic of almost 2 indicate that our model is 
reasonably well specified.79 θ Theta ( ) is significantly negative indicating that error correction 
cannot be rejected. In the base and the peak cases, we find the typical characteristic of 
positive asymmetric cost pass-through: while in the first two weeks, positive EUA price 
                                                 
78 ARCH: AutoRegressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic Model (for details see: Greene (2002, p.216ff)). 
79 Note that including coal prices and electricity demand as explanatory variables does not prove significant. The 
residual tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov cannot reject normality; Engels ARCH can reject conditional 
heteroscedasticity) cannot reject normality. 
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shocks have a stronger positive influence on EEX prices, negative shocks (i.e. EUA price 




− < 11 ˆˆ tt ββ ). The B
+ and B- 
values calculated according to (3) confirm the quicker pass-through of positive EUA price 
shocks to electricity future prices (see Figure 7). While the null hypothesis of symmetric cost 
pass-through cannot be rejected for the peak case, it can be rejected on the 5% confidence 
level for the base case. The latter is evidence for positive asymmetric cost pass-through. 
 
One additional finding merits notice. The last lag of the asymmetric coefficient is in all cases 
high (~0.5) and highly significant unlike most other lags. This indicates that the imposed error 
correction forces our model back to the equilibrium in the last period. Although it may be 
possible to detect additional dynamics by including more lags, this is infeasible because the 
ratio of variables over observations is already critical.80
Figure 6: Impact of EUA price changes on electricity price changes estimated using an ECM and data 
from the German electricity and emissions markets 2005-2007 
  
 





















                                                 
80 The number of variables equal ( ) 33 +×+ nx , where x  is the number of exogenous variables and n  is the 
number of lags. This is critical since the data sample consists of only two years and correspondingly only 104- n  
weekly observations are available. 
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(b) Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model  
 
A way to circumvent the difficulties of the ECM is by omitting the error correction term, thus 
deviating from the idea of a long-term equilibrium. By doing so, the forced upward trend in 
the last lag and the number of estimated coefficients can be greatly reduced.81


















Karrenbrock (1991) our autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model is: 
  (4) 
In (4), we can test the hull hypothesis of symmetric cost pass-through against the alternative 
hypothesis of asymmetric cost pass-through by finding whether −+ = ii ββ for all i . 
Table 18: Autoregressive distributed lag model results 
Variable Base Peak 
R2 ( 2R ) 71% (67%) 52% (46%) 
2σ  0.5 1.0 
Durbin-Watson 1.47 1.33 
Engels ARCH (CV 5%=3.84) 2.61 0.10 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (CV 5%=0.13) 0.07 0.09 
dCO2+t 0.18 * 0.18  
dCO2+t-1 0.13  -0.01  
dCO2+t-2 -0.09  -0.14  
dCO2+t-3 0.52 *** 0.76 *** 
dCO2-t  -0.04  0.03  
dCO2-t-1 -0.19 *** -0.23 ** 
dCO2-t-2 0.22 *** 0.17 * 
dCO2-t-3 0.51 *** 0.38 *** 
∑ +2dCO  0.74  0.79  
∑ −2dCO  0.50  0.35  
dGASt -0.01  0.00  
dGASt-1 0.03  0.04  
dGASt-2 0.01  0.01  
dGASt-3 0.04 * 0.06 * 
 F(H0: CO2sym vs. H1: CO2asym) 4.1 *** 3.4 ** 
*,**,*** Coefficient different from zero on the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence intervals 
respectively. 
Weekly average 2005-2006 data (99 observations). 
 
Therefore, we estimate (4) using a specification comparable to the presented ECM. The ADL 
model results indicate a slightly inferior fit compared to the ECM in terms of adjusted R2 and 
                                                 
81 Note that Geweke (2004) criticizes (4) since it implies the gap between prices and cost will grow indefinitely 
in the long-term. In our case, however, this argument does not hold because the length of our sample does not 
allow the prices to return sufficiently often to the long-term equilibrium. 
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Durbin-Watson statistics. Nevertheless, the results in Table 18 provide strong evidence for 
positive asymmetric cost pass-through of EUA prices. The accumulated sums of the lagged 
coefficients for positive EUA price changes in both cases are larger than those for negative 
ones (see Figure 7). Further, we can reject the hypothesis of EUA symmetric cost pass-
through to electricity futures prices in favor of the asymmetric version on the 5% confidence 
level. Moreover, assuming asymmetric gas price pass-through does not prove significant in 
general,82
Figure 7: Cost Pass-through of EUAs in base and peak future 2007 prices 2005-2006 
 this is evidence that asymmetric pricing is not a universal phenomenon in 
electricity futures markets but is specific to the EUA price pass-through. 


















cumulated sum of lagged effects of positive cost shocks




This chapter analyzes asymmetric cost pass-through between EUA and electricity future 
prices in Germany by applying error correction and ADL models. We find convincing 
evidence that emission prices are passed through asymmetrically to electricity futures prices 
in Germany. 
 
We observe that since most industry-specific explanations for asymmetric pricing (search 
cost, inventories, menu cost, signaling, and the like) do not apply for wholesale electricity 
markets, two intuitive explanations arise, although neither is fully convincing. First, 
asymmetric cost pass-through may be a sign of an early market phase, where knowledge and 
expertise about handling a newly introduced cost factor develop over time. Second, finding 
evidence of asymmetric pricing may indicate the exercise of market power by German 
generators. 
                                                 
82 See Table 19 in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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III.5 Appendix  
Figure 8: Residual tests 



















Normplot ECM Residuals Futures Base





Histogram ECM Residuals Futures Base



















Normplot ADL Residuals Futures Base





Histogram ADL Residuals Futures Base



















Normplot ECM Residuals Futures Peak





Histogram ECM Residuals Futures Peak



















Normplot ADL Residuals Futures Peak







Histogram ADL Residuals Futures Peak
 
 
Table 19: F-Test for asymmetric cost pass-through in the ADL model 
 Future Base Future Peak 
F(H0: CO2sym vs. H1: CO2asym) given GASasym 4.1*** 2.9** 
F(H0: GASsym vs. H1: GASasym) given CO2asym 1.8 1.9 
F(H0: CO2&GASsym vs. H1: CO2&GASasym ) 3.0*** 2.7** 
F(H0: CO2sym vs. H1: CO2asym) given GASsym 4.1*** 3.4** 




IV Electricity Wholesale Market Prices in Europe: Convergence?  
IV.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the development of a single electricity market in Europe. We pay 
particular attention to cross-border trade via explicit transmission capacity auctions, which 
allows us to identify inefficiencies in international electricity trade. 
 
A common electricity market is expected to increase welfare by ensuring security of supply, 
stimulating competition, and reaping the gains from international cooperation through such 
means as reserve sharing, combining different national consumption and production patterns, 
etc. To create a single European market, the EU has issued two directives, one regulation and 
several decisions that oblige both old and new member states to undertake substantial reform 
efforts. The measures require that: markets be opened (e.g. Directive 2003/54/EC); obstacles 
to cross-border trade be reduced (Regulation 1228/2003); and that non-discriminatory third-
party access to the network be guaranteed (e.g. Directive 2003/54/EC). To date, 
implementation (via the enactment of national laws) among the member states varies. Even a 
cursory read of the reports benchmarking national electricity sector reforms such as EC 
(2005), EC (2006), and OXERA (2005) reveals the differences that remain. Although there 
has been substantial progress by some members, the EU’s ultimate goal is yet far off. 
 
Given these circumstances, several authors wonder whether market outcomes can confirm the 
success of the reforms with respect to the EU’s common market policy. Bower (2002), 
Armstrong and Galli (2003, 2005), Boisseleau (2004), and Turvey (2006) compare day-ahead 
wholesale market prices at several European power exchanges. Bower (2002) applies 
correlation and cointegration analysis to 2001 prices from the Nordic countries, Germany, 
Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands. He concludes that some European electricity markets 
(especially the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and its neighbors) were already integrated 
to a certain extent by 2001.83
                                                 
83 However, this result is mainly due to Bower’s use of unweighted daily average data; given the strong 
differences between peak and off-peak price behavior in the market, it is an inappropriate representation of price 
data. 
 A relevant chapter in Boisseleau (2004) that focuses on 
regression and correlation analysis determines that the level of integration of European 
markets is quite low. Both Bower (2002) and Boisseleau (2004) describe the respective status 
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quo of European market integration; in contrast, Armstrong and Galli (2005) analyze the 
evolution of price differentials in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain from 2002 to 
2004, and conclude that European electricity prices converge in this period.84
International electricity price convergence
 Turvey (2006) 
examines the use of interconnectors and the pricing of scarce transmission capacities. Based 
on the example of the Anglo-French Interconnector, he provides empirical indication for the 
insufficient correlation of flows and price differentials. 
 
85 can be triggered by different factors, such as the 
convergence of factor prices; the convergence of product prices86
We distinguish between the level of market integration: the (static) degree to which the single 
European market is attained; and price convergence: the (dynamic) measure for the 
development of prices toward a single European price. Unlike the empirical studies mentioned 
above, this chapter accounts for the effects of congestion and congestion management by 
; the harmonization of the 
institutional framework; the convergence of electricity market regulation; the convergence of 
production technologies and consumption patterns; and increasing international electricity 
trade. While changing investment behavior as well as mergers and acquisitions will primarily 
have long-term impacts, the growth of international trade will promote market integration in 
the short- and medium-term. This chapter concentrates on the latter. We test whether 
European day-ahead wholesale prices converged between 2002 and 2006. Showing that 
national prices approach convergence over time would indicate that the single market policy 
was effective in the medium-term, and finding no convergence would imply the (at least 
initial) shortcomings of those policies. 
 
                                                 
84 Their reasoning is based on the comparison of three yearly averages of price differentials. Because Armstrong 
and Galli (2003, 2005) did not perform statistical tests on the significance of their results and ignored the cross-
border capacity rationing mechanisms, it remains uncertain whether their conclusions can be generalized. 
85 The term “convergence” follows the definition used by Engel and Rogers (2004), i.e. price convergence is the 
reduction of international price level dispersion over time. Thus, neither increasing correlation of the price series 
nor a reduction in the volatility of the international price differences are sufficient conditions for assuming 
convergence. By contrast, a significant reduction in the systematic price difference between two markets implies 
convergence. 
86 The Heckscher-Ohlin model, for example, predicts that factor (i.e., electricity) prices converge when product 
prices converge. 
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including the prices in the daily auctions for the use of scarce transmission capacities (so-




To capture both market integration and price convergence, our line of argument consists of 
three steps. First, we demonstrate by means of PCA that no single European electricity market 
exists to date. Second, using stationarity tests, we show that several price pairs converged 
bilaterally in 2002-2006. Third, we provide evidence that congestion, as represented by the 
hourly cross-border capacity auction prices, cannot fully explain the insufficient electricity 
market integration observed.  
 
 
Workable, wholesale electricity markets are a cornerstone of the EU’s desire to build a single 
market. Thus, most of the old and some of the new EU member states have established power 
exchanges in recent years. Nearly all feature a spot market on which electricity for each hour 
of the day ahead is traded. We use their “on the hour” prices to examine intraday 
developments and compare them across markets. 
 
Our dataset consists of information from six West European countries (Austria; France; 
Germany; Netherlands; Spain; and the UK); two new Central European EU member states 
(Poland; Czech Republic)88
                                                 
87 Since administrative “congestion charges” no longer exist in the West- and Central European Union for the 
Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), we use the term as a synonym for the prices paid in cross-
border capacity auctions. 
88 We focus on the two largest electricity producers in this region: Poland and the Czech Republic. A detailed 
description of their respective electricity market design and structure appears in Hirschhausen and Zachmann 
(2006). In brief, the competitive situation in both countries is rather disappointing. The Czech generation sector 
is characterized by a quasi-monopolist (CEZ) that uses its rents to acquire stakes in generation and distribution 
companies all across Eastern Europe. The Polish wholesale market, although quite decentralized at the moment, 
shows strong tendencies towards an oligopoly of three integrated coal and power plant companies. For the time 
being, the impediment to a functioning Polish wholesale market is the remaining long-term contracts between 
electricity generators and the TSO. The wholesale markets in both countries are only beginning to emerge. 
Absent an ordinary electricity exchange, the Czech market operator OTE organizes an electricity spot market in 
the Czech Republic. Though it provides prices for almost all hours of the year, the liquidity is still low. The 
Polish Power Exchange (PPX) also suffers from low trading volumes. These can be explained by existing long-
term contracts and the inadequate balancing and reserve market design that renders efficient electricity trade 
rather difficult (Toczyłowski (2005)). The low liquidity of the Polish market is, however, in contrast to the 
almost total absence of outliers in the price series. As a result of the relatively high volumes traded at the EEX, 
the German prices act as reference prices for the entire region. 
; and three North European price areas (East Denmark; West 
Denmark; and Sweden). The sample covers the years 2002 to 2006. This limitation to less 
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than five years results from the insufficient liquidity in most of the considered markets before 
2002. Nevertheless, the significant changes in the market framework during this period (e.g., 
Directive 2003/54/EC, Regulation 1228/2003), and the high data frequency available should 
reveal the systematic developments of market integration. 
 
Table 20 summarizes the domestic electricity consumption, electricity traded on the spot 
market and the resulting spot market liquidity in 2005 for the eleven points (and their 
abbreviations). Since participation in most of the wholesale spot markets is considered 
voluntary, their liquidity represents a relatively small fraction of domestic consumption; this 
is especially true for the Polish, Czech, Austrian and British day-ahead prices.89
                                                 
89 We note that the liquidity of some electricity exchanges is quite low. Absent equally consistent data, the spot 
prices are usually considered as the national reference price. The economic reasoning is that if the “real” price 
were essentially different from the power exchange price, arbitrageurs would be inclined to buy on the cheaper 
and sell on the more expensive markets without any risk of forcing the prices to converge. 
  
 
Apart from the UKPX, the markets feature uniform price, sealed bid, one-shot day-ahead 
electricity auctions. The auctioneer collects all supply and demand bids and orders them into 
24 hourly bid collections. Market clearing is done once per trading day and separately for 
each hour; physical delivery of the electricity sold is taken on the following day. Despite 
minor differences in structure, liquidity, products and market mechanisms, the power 
exchanges in Austria (EXAA), France (Powernext - PNX), Germany (EEX), the Netherlands 
(APX), and Poland (PPX) operate in similar fashion. The Nordic countries (Denmark; 
Finland; Norway; and Sweden) have a common power exchange called NordPool which 
organizes a joint spot market (Elspot). The Spanish power exchange (OMEL) is a mandatory 
pool leading to a comparably high liquidity. With its low liquidity of 0.6 % (2005), the Czech 
market (OTE) is not a typical power exchange but we include it in our dataset because it 
provides the only available data on hourly day-ahead prices from this major exporting 
country. Finally, the UKPX features a continuous trading period of 48 hours that closes only a 
half hour ahead of delivery.  
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Table 20: Liquidity of European power exchanges  





Volume 2005 in 
TWh 
Total Consumption 
2005 in TWh 
Share of Power 
Traded Spot 
APX – Amsterdam Power 
Exchange (NL) € 16.0 114.7 14% 
EEX – European Energy 
Exchange, Leipzig (D) € 85.3 556.4 15% 
EXAA - Energy Exchange 
Austria, Graz (A) € 1.5 63.2 2% 
DKE – East Danish 






42% DKW –West Danish NordPool price area (DK) DK 
SWE – Swedish NordPool 
price area (S) SK 
PNX – Powernext,  
Paris (F) € 19.7 482.4 4% 
PPX – Polish Power 
Exchange, Warsaw (POL) Zt 2.0 130.6 2% 
UKPX – UK Power 
Exchange, London (UK) ₤ 8.8 407.3 2% 
OMEL - Operador del 
Mercado Ibérico de Energía, 
Madrid (ES) 
€ 223.3 252.8 88% 
OTE – Czech Market 
Operator, Prague (CZ) CZK 0.4 62.7 1% 
Sources:  
Consumption: websites of the Organisation for the Nordic Transmission System Operator 
[www.nordel.org], the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity [www.ucte.org] 
and the UK Department of Trade and Industry (now UK Department for Business, Enterprise & 
Regulatory Reform) [www.berr.gov.uk/energy/statistics];  
Spot Volumes: websites of the respective power exchanges 
 
IV.3 Methodology and Results 
(a) No Full Market Integration 
 
 
Figure 9 depicts the average differences of each price series from the common mean price 
series. Obviously, no unit-price, single European market exists as average price differences 
are significant and in the extreme attain levels of more than 60€/MWh (e.g. SWE-APX 13h). 
Whereas some markets are constantly above (OMEL) or below (OTE, PPX) the European 
average price, others encounter quite different price patterns. EEX, EXAA, APX and PNX are 
significantly more expensive than the average during on-peak hours (8h-20h), while DKE, 
SWE, PPX and UKPX are below average in these hours. Only DKW approximately matches 
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the European average. The resemblance of the French (PNX), the Austrian (EXAA) and the 
German (EEX) price profile points to some regional clustering of electricity markets.  
 
Figure 9: Hourly average of eleven European electricity price series (upper left) as well as the individual 
deviation from the common mean (all other) January 2005-July 2006 (in €/MWh)90
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We can use PCA to reveal the regional price interactions.91 The underlying idea is to calculate 
the linear combinations of the original data matrix that explain most of the variance. Our data 
matrix consists of the weekday price series for the eleven wholesale markets. The PCA is 
carried out separately only for a typical off-peak (3h) and a typical on-peak hour (13h).92 To 
give an impression of the development of the European electricity market integration over 
time, we subdivide the sample into March 2002 to June 2004 and June 2004 to July 2006. We 
calculate the first and second principal component for the normalized data, and compute the 
correlation between the principal components and the original data.93
Figure 10
 This allows visualizing 
the clustering of the markets by plotting the correlation coefficient of each price series with 
the first principal component on the X-axis and with the second principal component on the 
Y-axis.  indicates that the eleven wholesale markets can be roughly divided into two 
                                                 
90 The mean price at the APX at the 12th hour, not represented in the figure to make the eleven other figures 
better readable and have a common scale, is 46.95. 
91 See footnote 52. 
92 Plotting the results for all 24 hours of the day provides little value added, as 2:00-3:00 (3h) and 12:00-13:00 
(13h) mark boundary cases essentially enveloping all other hour of the day patterns. 
93 Detailed results may be obtained from the author upon request. 
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regional groups: the Austrian (EXAA), Dutch (APX), German (EEX) and French (PNX) 
market and the East Danish (DKE), West Danish (DKW) and Swedish (SWE) market. The 
British (UKPX), Spanish (OMEL), Czech (OTE) and Polish (PPX) markets cannot be clearly 
attributed to either group.  
 
Figure 10 also presents the percentage of variance explained by the first PC (the first principal 
component with which almost all series are positively correlated can be interpreted as a 
common European electricity price development). As τ1 (the variance explained by the first 
PC94
                                                 
94 The variance explained by the 
) is significantly below 100% in all considered cases it is thus evident that full market 
integration has not been achieved. The significant increase of τ1 from the early (2002-2004) to 
the more recent (2004-2006) period both for the on-peak (31%  52%) and off-peak (40%  
63%), however, implies that at least some individual series approach the common European 
pattern. Another interesting finding is that prices are better explained by the first principal 
component during off-peak. One explanation may be that networks are less utilized in low-
consumption off-peak hours, leading to lower cross-border congestion and thus allowing for 
more international trade.  
 








λλτ , where iλ is the i
th  largest eigenvalue (see footnote 52). 
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Figure 10: Correlation of the 3rd and 13th hour wholesale spot prices with their first (X-axis) and second 
(Y-axis) principal component as well as variance explained by the first (τ1) principal component 
 
 
(b) Signs of Convergence 
 
PCA provides some indication that a common European price pattern is increasingly able to 
explain national price developments.95
[ ]1,1−=β
 The concept of “convergence” allows studying the 
intensification of integration for each pair of countries separately. Following the empirical 
literature (e.g. St. Aubyn (1999) or Bernard and Durlauf (1996)) one method to assess 
regional convergence is by testing if the difference of the two regional series contains no unit 
root, i.e. if the series are cointegrated with the cointegration vector 96. According to 
this approach, bilateral electricity market convergence implies that the difference in the 
logarithm of national electricity spot prices is stationary.97 By applying the ADF98
                                                 
95 Note that PCA cannot be used to explicitly demonstrate convergence as the increased ability of the first PC to 
explain the variance of the data is potentially due to the significant and largely exogenous electricity price 
increases throughout Europe in 2004-2006. Thus, the increase in the first PC is not sufficient to demonstrate 
convergence as defined in FN 
 and the 
85. 
96 Note that the interaction of wholesale electricity prices has already been studied using cointegration analysis, 
e.g. by De Vany and Walls (1999). 
97 i.e. According to the definition in Hamilton (1994, p.45) ( ) ( )( ) ∞<=− σtji pp loglogVar  and 
( ) ( )( ) µ=− tji pp loglogE  for all t . 
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KPSS99
The ADF test is specified according to Case 1 in Hamilton (1994, p.528), i.e. without trend 
and constant. In other words, we want the price differences to collapse to zero and not to some 
constant. Thus, the one percent critical value for long series is -2.58. The lag length is selected 
according to Ng and Perron (1995).
 tests, the combination permits us to test jointly for divergence and convergence since 
the ADF test is based upon the null hypothesis of a unit root (i.e. rejection suggests 
convergence) and the KPSS test is based upon the null hypothesis of stationarity (i.e. rejection 
suggests divergence).  
 
100 The KPSS test is specified without time trend, leading 
to a one percent critical value of 0.74. The window length is specified according to Smith and 
Otero (2005).101
Table 21: Pair wise stationarity (+) or unit root (-) of base electricity price differential 2002-2006 
according to KPSS and ADF tests 
  
 DKW SWE OMEL PNX UKPX EEX OTE PPX EXAA APX # 
DKE ++ + +  -  + -- - - 4 
DKW   +  -  + -- -  3 
SWE   +  -    - - 2 
OMEL       ++ -  + 5 
PNX      + + -- ++  3 
UKPX        -- - -- 0 
EEX       ++ -- ++ + 4 
OTE         + ++ 7 
PPX         -- -- 0 
EXAA          + 4 
APX           4 
+  : ADF rejects unit root at the 1% level and KPSS accepts stationarity at the 1% level => Convergence 
++  : ADF rejects unit root at the 1% level and KPSS accepts stationarity at the 5% level => Convergence 
-   : ADF accepts unit root at the 1% level and KPSS rejects stationarity at the 1% level => Divergence 
--  : ADF accepts unit root at the 5% level and KPSS rejects stationarity at the 1% level => Divergence 
  : All other cases (including reject both and accept both) => Undecidable 
 
Using the setup described, we test for pair wise convergence of prices. Table 21 presents the 
results for daily average electricity prices.102
                                                                                                                                                        
98 ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller test, for details see Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
99 KPSS: for details see Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992). 
100 Starting at pmax = integer[12*(T/100)^1/4], we want to find out if the absolute value of the t-statistic of the 
last lagged difference is >1.6. If yes, we perform the unit root test; otherwise, we reduce p by one and repeat the 
process. 
101 Window length l = integer[12*(T/100)^1/4]. Note that the choice of the ADF lag length and the KPSS 
window length are crucial as the number of rejections decrease significantly with an increase in both measures. 
102 Note that testing stationarity separately for peak hours produces almost identical results. 
 We find that 18 pairs of prices converge, 18 
diverge and 19 are insignificant – an indication that European electricity market integration 
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has not been a universal process (if it did occur, it was on a pair wise basis only). In fact, the 
outcomes provide indication that convergence is predominantly driven by bilateral cross-
border market integration. Whereas almost half of the prices of the directly linked markets 
converge (7/16), only one-quarter of the none-linked markets show significant convergence 
(11/39). Moreover, nine of these eleven none-linked but converging market pairs include 
either the Czech (5) and/or the Spanish (5) markets. We posit that convergence of the Czech 
price series is probably driven by increasing liquidity which forces the OTE price to approach 
the “real” Czech price (which is linked to the European price via the German EEX prices). It 
is less obvious why the Spanish (OMEL) prices approach the Nordic (DKE, DKW, and SWE) 
as well as the Dutch (APX) prices. 
 
Using unit root tests for testing convergence is not universally accepted103 for at least three 
reasons. First, stationarity of the price differential can imply both full market integration and 
price convergence, making it impossible to distinguish whether two markets are still 
converging or have already integrated. Second, in situations where mean price convergence is 
associated with increasing volatility, the stationarity test can erroneously reject the 
convergence hypothesis. This is relevant to our analysis because electricity prices and thus the 
volatility of the difference series increased significantly in the past several years.104











 Third, in 
the presence of mean and variance “jumps” as well as outliers, unit root tests lack robustness. 
Therefore, we design an alternative approach. 
 
The two simple indicators for the integration of two markets are the difference of the prices in 
both countries and the ratio of the prices. We choose the logged ratio since it can be 
interpreted as the relative deviation from full integration. The gross integration measure is 
calculated according to 
. 
                                                 
103 See for example Bernard and Durlauf (1995, 1996) and St. Aubyn (1999). 
104 Increasing volatility of the difference series is insufficient for demonstrating the absence of convergence (as 
defined in FN 85) because the level of two series might approach even though the volatility of the difference 
series increases. In fact, the difference series of two perfectly parallel price series has zero volatility, while this 
volatility increases, if the price series start to converge. 
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Thus, full integration is achieved if 0, , =
ji
tgrossγ  for all t. The integration indicator is noisy and 
characterized by many significant outliers because of the high volatility of hourly prices. To 
extract the long-term development of market integration, we filter out idiosyncratic and short-











,        (1) 
where  ),0(~ 2εσε Nt  and ),0(~
2
υσυ Nt  are iid error terms and tα  is the vector of 
unobservable coefficients at time t. 
 
Through filtering out short-term shocks ( tε ) the estimated tα̂  represents the long-term pattern 
of integration.105 tα̂ To estimate , we must make assumptions about the initial variances of tε , 
tυ  and 0α  as well as on the expected value of 0α  and β . Setting 10 )( γα =E  and 1)( =βE  is 
straightforward but setting the variances is less so.106
( ) 100/2 tVar γσυ =
 Visual inspection suggests that 
, ( )tVar γσε =2  and 1020 =ασ  will provide an acceptable compromise in 
noise reduction and signal preservation. We can assure stable estimates by performing the 
filter and smoother algorithm up to five times using the estimated coefficients and variances 
as inputs for the subsequent run. 
 
We estimate equation (7) separately for each hour of the weekday series for the German-
Czech, German-Polish, German-Dutch, German-East Danish, German-West Danish, German-
French, Polish-Czech and French-Spanish borders. Consequently, we obtain 192 smoothed 
                                                 
105 As described in Hamilton (1994, p.399ff), time-varying coefficient models such as (1) are estimated using the 
Kalman filter and smoother. We use the Matlab Kalman filter toolbox by Kevin Murphy, 1998 [see 
http://www.ai.mit.edu/~murphyk/Software/kalman.html]. 
106 Generally, we can interpret the initial variances as the starting point of the search for the global extrema of the 
likelihood function. Therefore, if the function has several local maxima, a “wrong” starting point can lead to 
undesirable results. This is why the initial variances should be carefully selected. The trade-off can be described 
as follows: using too-high values for 2
υσ  and 
2
0α
σ  would lead to the inclusion of short-term behavior in tα  which 
would make it difficult to distinguish idiosyncratic shocks from systematic patterns. On the other hand, setting a low variance for tυ  would ignore significant developments in the convergence process. 
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integration indicator series. Figure 3 (darker line) shows the third and thirteenth hour series 
for the German-Dutch and the German-West Danish borders.107
Figure 11: Smoothed integration indicator 
 
 
tα̂  for the EEX-APX and EEX-DKW borders for the 3rd and 
13th hour series 
 
 
We can now use the smoothed integration indicator tα  to test whether the two prices 
converge/diverge, and by regressing 2ˆ tα  on constant ( 1δ ) and time trend ( t2δ ) we can test 
increases/decreases in market integration. As the error terms ( tξ ) in tt t ξδδα ++= 21
2ˆ  are not 
normally independently distributed, the usual t-statistics do not apply for testing the null 
hypotheses that 1δ  and/or 2δ  will not be zero. Therefore, we bootstrap the table of critical 
values, and estimate 1̂δ  and 2δ̂  for 1,000 randomly reordered series of 
( )ji ngrossjigrossjigrossji Tgross , ,, 2,, 1,, , ,,, γγγγ = .108
                                                 
107 The results for all studied country combinations and hourly series may be obtained from the author upon 
request. 
108 The task is arduous since it must be performed separately for all studied pairs of countries as well as for all 










  EEX - APX 3 h 




  EEX - APX 13 h 








  EEX - DKW 3 h   EEX - DKW 13 h 
not considering congestion charge (gross)  
including congestion charge (net)  
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Now that we know the critical value, we can test for pair wise long-term price 
convergence/divergence. Theoretically, full market integration is achieved if all ji Tgross
,
,γ  are 
indistinguishable from zero. We assume full integration of market i  and j  if no ji tgross
,
,γ  is 
larger than a half standard deviation of the (more volatile) underlying log electricity price 
series. Following this notion, we observe that the German-French market integrates in the 
sample period for four hours (1h, 2h, 10h and 17h). The integration of the two biggest 
Continental wholesale markets in two off-peak and two shoulder hours (between on-peak and 
off-peak) confirms the strong correlation of both markets that we already obtained using PCA.  
 
Convergence towards full integration is assumed if we can reject both the null hypotheses 
01 ≤δ  and 02 ≥δ . The results summarized in Table 22 reveal that while the gross price 
differentials between France and Spain and between Germany and the Netherlands decrease 
in all hourly series, gross convergence in the Polish-Czech, German-Czech, German-Polish 
and both German-Danish cases is primarily an off-peak period phenomenon. Our 
computations demonstrate that 113 of the 192 hourly pairs of price series converge between 
2002 and 2006 (revealing that the degree of market integration generally increased during this 
period of active market development109
If we can reject both the null hypotheses 
). However, we also note that more than a third of the 
price series pairs do not converge. This finding should raise doubts about the effectiveness of 
the market reforms. 
 
01̂ ≤δ  and 0ˆ2 ≤δ , the price series diverges pair 
wise; we find this to be true for 48 of the 192 series.110
                                                 
109 The obvious volatility of the convergence process (see 
 In fact, almost all of the German-East 
Danish, German-West Danish and German-Polish on-peak price series diverge significantly. 
The higher frequency of gross convergence in off-peak (72 vs. 41) and divergence in on-peak 
(12 vs. 36) is explained by the scarcity of transmission capacity, i.e., when congestion and 
Figure 11) does not permit us to conclude that the 
observed convergence occurs at constant speed or will be non-reversible. 
110 Consequently, 27 series showed no significant signs of convergence or divergence, or attained full 
integration. 
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gross price differentials are more distinctive in high-load periods. The effect abates when we 
include congestion charges (see next section).111
Table 22: Number of hours of the day in which the price series significantly (5%) converges/diverges when 
not correcting for hourly congestion charges (gross) 
 
 
 Load  
Period 
PPX- EEX- EEX- EEX- EEX- EEX- EEX- PNX- Σ  
OTE OTE PPX PNX APX DKE DKW OME 
Integration     4     4 
Convergence 
Σ =114 
off-peak 10 8 7 5 12 10 9 11 72 
on-peak 5 4  8 12   12 41 
Divergence 
Σ =48 
off-peak   5 2  2 3  12 
on-peak   12 1  11 12  36 
 
IV.4 Including Congestion Charges  
 
Despite the study period’s very active international trading, the results of both the PCA and 




persistence of international price differentials is often justified by the scarcity of cross-border 
transmission capacities. Capacity allocation (also termed “congestion management methods”) 
varies throughout the Continent occasionally changing in the most recent years (see 
). The dynamic is illustrated at the German-Czech-Polish border where in recent years, 
improvements in congestion management were undertaken in four steps: First, unilateral 
explicit auctions were introduced between Poland and the Czech Republic (since August 2002 
on the CEPS113
                                                 
111 Comparing the sums of hourly series converging ignores the reality that adjacent hourly series are highly 
correlated. 
112 Market integration can be triggered by the following: (1) an adjustment of factor prices, e.g. fuel prices, 
emissions cost, interest rates and wages; (2) the adaptation of a common institutional framework, e.g. emissions 
trading scheme, pollution prevention legislation, taxes or safety standards; (3) the convergence of electricity 
market regulation; (4) common production and consumption patterns, e.g. due to shared weather phenomena, 
resource endowments or fuel supplies; and (5) international electricity trade. The latter can prompt full market 
integration independent of the other causes. 
113 The TSOs are Vattenfall Europe Transmission (VE-T) and E.on Netz for Germany, PSE-Operator (PSE) for 
Poland and CEPS for the Czech Republic. 
 side) as well as between Germany and Poland/Czech Republic (on the 
E.on Netz / VE-T side). Second, bilateral auctions were organized by CEPS, VE-T and E.on 
Netz between Germany and Poland/Czech Republic in 2003. In both described stages, only 
yearly and monthly capacity bands were auctioned. In a third step, daily capacity auctions 
were introduced between Germany and the Czech Republic in 2004. Whereas the 
 66 
aforementioned monthly and yearly capacities between Germany and the Czech Republic 
were divided between E.on Netz and VE-T and auctioned by their administrator114, CEPS 
carried out the daily auctions. The situation in 2004 which was characterized by bilateral 
daily/monthly and yearly auctions between E.on Netz/VE-T and CEPS as well as unilateral 
auctions of Polish-Czech congestions proved unsatisfactory. The problems included the lack 
of a Polish-German auction and the absence of coordination of the transmission capacities in 
the highly meshed German-Czech-Polish triangle.115 To resolve these issues, a fourth step 
was taken when coordinated auctions between VE-T, PSE and CEPS were introduced in 
2005. Yearly and monthly auctions were implemented at the beginning of the year, and daily 
auctions, selling single hour capacity bands, in April.116 In particular, the coordinated daily 
auctions should have increased arbitrage significantly since price differences and thus the 
shadow prices of the bottlenecks vary greatly during the day.117
Table 23: Cross-border congestion management method in the sample period January 2002-August 2006 
 
 DKW SWE EEX UKPX OMEL APX PPX EXAA 
DKE IA IA <2005 EA >2005 IA       
DKW  IA EA      











   EA <2005 EA* >2005 CEA 
NMB (no 
congestion) 





EA: Explicit Auction;  EA*: Explicit Auction without day-ahead auctions;  
AL: Access Limitation; CEA: Coordinated Explicit Auction (Poland; Czech Republic; Germany);  
IA: Implicit Auction;  NMB: Non-Market-Based (e.g. pro rata; priority list)  
The table roughly summarizes ETSO (2004, p.5-7) and ETSO (2006, p.7-10) where more detailed 
information can be found.  
 
In implicit auctions the market operator collects bids and offers for electricity deliveries in 
several regions and calculates regional prices accounting for any line limitations. If the 
transmission capacity between two areas becomes binding, the prices in both regions will 
differ. Consequently the congestion charge equals the price differential. In explicit auctions 
market participants can buy and sell electricity in all regional markets but must always ensure 
                                                 
114 CEPS obtained a fixed share of the revenues. 
115 In the COMECON period, the high-voltage system of the GDR, CSSR, Poland and other COMECON 
members was jointly operated by the Central Dispatch Organization of the Interconnected Power Systems 
(CDO/IPS) in Prague (Lagendijk (2005)). 
116 Data on the monthly and yearly auctions are available at http://www.e-trace.biz and for the daily auctions at 
http://market.ceps.cz/uc17.asp 
117 KEMA (2005), EFET (2004) and ETSO (2004).  
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that they acquire the requisite number of transmission rights. The rights are usually allocated 
in annual, monthly and daily auctions separately for each flow direction. Thus, if transmission 
demand exceeds line capacity we would expect the capacity auction price to be above zero 
and electricity prices in the linked markets to differ by exactly the auction price; otherwise, 






We collected the results of the day-ahead cross-border capacity rights auctions for eight intra-
European borders (France-Spain; Germany- Netherlands; Germany-Poland; Germany-Czech 
Republic; Germany-France; Germany-West Denmark; Germany-East Denmark; and Poland-
Czech Republic). These auctions provide separate prices for both directions for all 24 hours of 
the subsequent day. Since the hourly congestion charges are based on approximately the same 
set of available information as the corresponding electricity spot prices, our analytical 
comparison is simple.  
 
We construct a net integration measure by subtracting the congestion charges in the profitable 
direction (  or jitc
>− ) from the more expensive price 
( ) ( )




































We can interpret this indicator as the remaining arbitrage possibility from either undertaking a 
cross-border trade at date t if the auction price is below the international price differential, or 
rejecting a cross-border trade if the auction price is above it. In reality, the arbitrage freeness 
condition 0, , =
ji
tnetγ  t∀  can be fulfilled in implicit auctions since ( )0,max jtitijt ppc −=>−  holds 
by definition. In explicit cross-border capacity auctions where the markets operate 
sequentially, players face uncertainties in the capacity offered, the congestion charges and the 
price differentials. Because of the uncertainties in timing, 0, , ≠
ji
tnetγ  does not necessarily imply 
an unused arbitrage possibility in time t since players may be surprised by unpredicted price 
changes. Therefore, unused arbitrage possibilities can only be assumed if ( ) 0, , ≠ji tnetE γ . In this 
context the Kalman filter and smoother (see Section 3(b)) contains an especially useful 
                                                 
118 This arbitrage freeness assumes that traders will not spend more for transporting electricity than they can gain 
from it (i.e. the price differential), and that underpaying cross-border capacity auctions (i.e. price differential > 
congestion charge) is unsustainable since the potential gain (price differential minus congestion charge) will 
attract other players to enter the market, forcing the prices to converge toward arbitrage freeness. 
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interpretation: the filtered results can be seen as the expected realization of the underlying 
series in t+1 given the series up to point t, while the smoother provides the expected 
realization of the underlying series given the entire series. Stochastic deviations due to 
accidental prediction errors can be decomposed from systematic deviations. Thus, if the 
smoothed ji tnet
,
,γ  differs significantly from zero, it indicates that the price difference in t is 
expected to differ from zero (contradicting the assumption of arbitrage freeness). Applying 
the same testing procedure used for the gross price differential series ( ji tgross
,
,γ ) to the net price 
differential series ( ji tnet
,
,γ ) allows us to analyze the development of unused arbitrage 
possibilities over time. Joint plotting of tnet ,α̂ (the thin line in Figure 11) and tgross ,α̂ (heavy 
line) provides visual indication that hourly congestion charges often account for only a minor 
fraction of the gross price differential. This is proof that congestion is not solely responsible 
for insufficient market integration. 
 
Visual inspection of the smoothed net integration indicators reveals that only a few series 
show systematic arbitrage freeness (the thin line in Figure 11). Nevertheless, some of the 
smoothed series approach arbitrage freeness (e.g. EEX-DKW 3 in Figure 11). We also 
observe that gradual adjustments characterize the process of convergence, an indication that 
continual developments in cumulative liquidity, an increasing number of traders and perpetual 
learning improve net market integration.119
Applying the same testing strategy used for the gross price differential, we find that only 12 of 
the 192 series show full integration and that the price series of five markets converge in the 
majority of hours. We can also identify significant trends of net divergence in three markets 
(
 Hence, market reforms only gradually translate 
into more market integration. 
 
Table 24). Thus, despite the possibility of arbitrage, more than 93% of the markets fail to 
integrate and nearly 40% of the price series never converge.120
                                                 
119 Neuhoff (2003) argues that traders learn to handle explicit auctions. He finds that while in 2001 a simple 
trading strategy would have generated € 30.6 m profits at the Dutch-German border in the first six months of 
2002, only € 1.2 m were possible. 
120 The 40% stems from 76 neither integrated nor converging series (28 series diverging and 48 series without 
trend). 
 Such findings provide 
empirical indication that there are significant barriers to efficient cross-border trade when 
capacities are auctioned explicitly.  
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Table 24: Number of hours of the day in which the price series significantly (5%) converge/diverge when 
correcting for hourly congestion charges (net) 
 Load  
Period 
PPX- EEX- EEX- EEX- EEX- EEX- EEX- PNX- Σ  
OTE OTE PPX PNX APX DKE DKW OME 
Integration    1 11     12 
Convergence 
Σ =105 
off-peak 6 9 8 2 11 12 11 2 
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off-peak 1  3 2    1 
8 
on-peak 7  4 3  2  4 
20 
 
The demonstrated inadequacy of explicit auctions to provide long-term arbitrage freeness has 
been assumed both in the political discussion and the theoretical literature. Ehrenmann and 
Smeers (2005) for example point out that explicit auctions will produce results inferior to 
those of implicit actions because of the uncertainties for traders and the different network 
aggregation mechanisms. In fact, trader uncertainties may be responsible for some of the 
detected distortions. Although the Kalman filter algorithm filtered out stochastic distortions, 
the uncertainties also should have led to the inclusion of a risk premium in the studied price 
relations.121 An indication of the importance of a risk premium is that divergence is slightly 
more present in on-peak than in off-peak while convergence is more frequent in off-peak. 
This finding correlates with the hypothesis that traders desire and expect a higher risk 
premium for the more volatile on-peak-time trading periods. Finally, it has been argued that 
market players may bid strategically in explicit auctions.122
The assumed shortcomings of explicit auctions have given rise to alternative congestion 
management methods. Proposals for continental Europe include establishing conventional 
systems like nodal pricing
  
 
123 and implicit auctions as well as extending the recently 
implemented open-market coupling for the French-Belgium-Dutch market.124
                                                 
121 A risk premium for traders should reward the market participants for bearing the described uncertainties of 
participating in explicit capacity auctions. Neuhoff (2003, p.4) describes this risk premium as an insurance: 
“traders price their buy bid in one market very high and their offer in the other market very low to avoid 
exposure to imbalance fees if only one bid is accepted.” 
  
122 See for example Neuhoff (2003), Brunekreeft et al. (2005, p.85) and Chapter V in this thesis. 
123 See for example Hogan (1992). 
124 A comparison of congestion management methods appears in Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) and 
CONSENTEC (2004). 
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IV.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This chapter provides empirical evidence that a single market for electricity in continental 
Europe had not been attained by mid-2006. PCA reveals that from June 2004 to July 2006, 
48% of the on-peak and 37% of the off-peak price variances cannot be explained by the first 
PC which can be interpreted as a common European price pattern.  
 
We demonstrate that national electricity price differences significantly diminish over time for 
some market pairs. Stationarity tests of wholesale price differentials indicate that price 
convergence is mainly driven by cross-border market integration. Studying the convergence 
hypothesis for smoothed hourly price differential series allows us to trace medium-term 
patterns as well as intra-daily differences. We find that 59% of the studied hourly pairs of 
national wholesale electricity prices in 2002-2006 converge. This increased market integration 
is mainly an off-peak phenomenon. While 64% of the converging series are in off-peak, 75% 
of the diverging series occur in on-peak. 
 
We also test the hypothesis that all remaining international price differences can be explained 
by cross-border transmission capacity auction prices. Arbitrage freeness is assured if the 
difference between cross-border price differentials and the associated transmission capacity 
prices is zero in expectation. We find that more than 93% of the studied market pairs feature 
significant predictable arbitrage opportunities, but that 42% do not converge towards arbitrage 
freeness.  
 
Our findings reveal that the market reforms undertaken in the last decade that explicitly 
targeted the creation of a single European market were only partially successful. We suggest 
that future research should include identifying the reasons for the inefficiencies of explicit 
auctions, such as risk premiums for traders and the exercise of market power. We believe that 
policymakers should be made aware of these and other potential obstacles to the gradual 




Table 25: Variance of the electricity price data matrix explained by the first (τ1) and the second (τ2) 
principal component 
 March 2002 - June 2004 June 2004 - July 2006 
 3h 13h 3h 13h 
τ1 40% 31% 63% 52% 
τ2 22% 20% 13% 14% 
 




















































1) Where no net price differential is given, there were either no explicit auctions (e.g. GER - F before 2006) or no data available (e.g. 
GER - PL 2004). 
2) In the figure, the absolute net price differentials, i.e. abs(price differential – congestion charge) are plotted. Therefore, the high 
remaining net price differentials do not generally indicate that daily explicit auctions are underpaid.  
3) The year 2006 only contains data prior to August. 
 








 13th hour 
DKE 0.42 0.37 0.29 0.34 
DKW 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.37 
SWE -0.11 0.07 0.28 0.27 
OMEL 0.15 0.30 0.29 0.30 
PNX 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.34 
UKPX 0.32 -0.06 0.32 0.29 
EEX 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.37 
OTE -0.12 0.17 0.19 0.26 
PPX 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.25 
EXAA 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.23 
APX 0.21 0.24 0.35 0.26 
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Table 27: Probability of convergence as well as the estimated intercept for each hourly series of the 
smoothed pair wise gross and net price relations 





















( )02 >δP  
PPX-OTE 1 3.75 100  0.25 80.9 13 0.17 90.6  0.01 20.8 
PPX-OTE 2 4.2 100  0.63 99.6 14 0.16 93.6  0.01 1.5 
PPX-OTE 3 4.59 100  1.41 100 15 0.42 100  0.04 24.4 
PPX-OTE 4 7.93 100  1.35 99.9 16 1.15 100  0.03 1.9 
PPX-OTE 5 10.15 100  2.01 100 17 0.68 100  0.01 0.2 
PPX-OTE 6 4.34 100  1.41 100 18 1.35 100  0 2.3 
PPX-OTE 7 0.87 51.6  0.53 99 19 2.95 100  0 1.9 
PPX-OTE 8 0.12 3.3  0.07 94.7 20 2.25 100  0.01 57.4 
PPX-OTE 9 0.34 42.8  0.01 2.5 21 0.22 99.7  0.03 93.7 
PPX-OTE 10 0.2 8.9  0 0.4 22 1.21 96.7  0.04 1.1 
PPX-OTE 11 0.25 94.3  -0.01 0 23 1.52 100  0.02 83.7 
PPX-OTE 12 0.23 9.1  0.02 5.1 24 3.42 100  0.09 52.4 
             
EEX-OTE 1 2.67 100  0.43 99.5 13 0.41 70.6  0.5 100 
EEX-OTE 2 2.54 98.4  0.55 99.8 14 0.46 76.8  0.29 100 
EEX-OTE 3 2.75 90.9  1.03 100 15 0.73 94.9  0.72 100 
EEX-OTE 4 4.86 100  0.82 100 16 1.45 100  0.29 100 
EEX-OTE 5 6.85 100  1.58 100 17 0.83 98.4  0.34 100 
EEX-OTE 6 3.27 99.7  1.18 100 18 1.58 100  0.27 100 
EEX-OTE 7 0.96 8.2  0.48 99.1 19 3.18 100  0.23 100 
EEX-OTE 8 0.25 38.6  0.04 60 20 2.23 100  0.1 98.9 
EEX-OTE 9 0.65 39.6  0.08 98.8 21 0.29 64  0.04 33.7 
EEX-OTE 10 0.48 57  0.14 99.9 22 1.22 26.6  0.08 74.2 
EEX-OTE 11 0.64 89  0.47 100 23 1.51 97.8  0.16 99.8 
EEX-OTE 12 0.79 91.9  0.55 100 24 2.92 99.4  0.19 96.6 
             
EEX-PPX 1 0.2 100  0.03 100 13 -0.11 0  0.07 0 
EEX-PPX 2 0.41 100  0.01 1.2 14 -0.09 0  0.1 6.6 
EEX-PPX 3 0.59 100  0.02 2.2 15 -0.09 0  0.1 5 
EEX-PPX 4 0.64 100  -0.02 0 16 -0.08 0  0.09 0.2 
EEX-PPX 5 0.58 100  0 0.6 17 -0.06 0  0.06 0.2 
EEX-PPX 6 0.25 100  0.04 100 18 -0.02 0  0.14 92.3 
EEX-PPX 7 0.07 0  0.08 100 19 -0.02 0  0.15 95.2 
EEX-PPX 8 -0.1 0  0.18 99.6 20 -0.01 0  0.09 98.9 
EEX-PPX 9 -0.1 0  0.14 92.3 21 -0.01 0  0.08 98 
EEX-PPX 10 -0.12 0  0.12 8.9 22 0.06 0  0.08 99.7 
EEX-PPX 11 -0.13 0  0.13 11 23 0.09 0  0.07 99.6 
EEX-PPX 12 0.03 0  0.07 0 24 0.16 100  0.05 100 
             
EEX-PNX 1 0.01 99,9  0 54.2 13 0.02 100  0 8.5 
EEX-PNX 2 0 48,4  0 55.5 14 0.01 100  0 69.8 
EEX-PNX 3 0.02 98,5  0.01 64.1 15 0 98.4  0 3.4 
EEX-PNX 4 0.02 99,7  0 21 16 0 98.9  0 4.8 
EEX-PNX 5 0 0  0 3.4 17 0 0  0 29.6 
EEX-PNX 6 0.01 0  0 0.3 18 0.01 100  0 87.9 
EEX-PNX 7 0.02 94,2  0 0.6 19 0 2.8  0 29.6 
EEX-PNX 8 0.05 100  -0.01 0.1 20 0 9.3  0.01 90.1 
EEX-PNX 9 0 97,3  0 2.2 21 0.02 100  0 98 
EEX-PNX 10 0 94,5  0 22.8 22 0.01 100  0 98.8 
EEX-PNX 11 0.01 100  0 60.3 23 0.01 100  0 61.5 
EEX-PNX 12 0.15 100  0 2.1 24 0.01 8.8  0 40 
Explanations: If ( )02 >δP >97.5 the hypothesis of convergence cannot be rejected on the 5% significant interval 
(two-sided test). If ( )02 >δP <2.5) the hypothesis of divergence cannot be rejected. The intercept indicates the 




Table 21, continued: Probability of convergence as well as the estimated intercept for each hourly series of 
the smoothed pair wise gross and net price relations 





















( )02 >δP  
EEX-APX 1 0.03 100  0.03 100 13 0.14 100  0.01 99.5 
EEX-APX 2 0.03 100  0.03 100 14 0.27 100  0.02 99.5 
EEX-APX 3 0.05 99.9  0.05 100 15 0.21 100  0.01 90.5 
EEX-APX 4 0.07 100  0.09 99.9 16 0.14 100  0.01 99.4 
EEX-APX 5 0.07 100  0.07 100 17 0.14 100  0.01 98.4 
EEX-APX 6 0.09 99.9  0.09 100 18 0.33 100  0.06 100 
EEX-APX 7 0.1 100  0.1 100 19 0.07 100  0 91.2 
EEX-APX 8 0.03 100  0.03 100 20 0.04 100  0 92.6 
EEX-APX 9 0.05 100  0.01 100 21 0.02 100  0.01 100 
EEX-APX 10 0.24 100  0.02 99.9 22 0 100  0 100 
EEX-APX 11 0.25 100  0.02 99.9 23 0.01 99  0.02 98.7 
EEX-APX 12 0.23 100  0.01 93.2 24 0.01 99.5  0.01 99.2 
             
EEX-DKE 1 0.38 100  0.19 100 13 0.06 0  0.09 100 
EEX-DKE 2 0.62 100  0.29 100 14 0.05 0  0.07 95.6 
EEX-DKE 3 0.81 100  0.39 100 15 0.07 0  0.06 100 
EEX-DKE 4 0.81 100  0.4 100 16 0.08 0  0.07 100 
EEX-DKE 5 0.81 100  0.36 100 17 0.07 0  0.05 100 
EEX-DKE 6 0.49 100  0.21 100 18 0.03 0  0 0 
EEX-DKE 7 0.25 100  0.14 100 19 0.03 0  0.01 0 
EEX-DKE 8 0.07 1.3  0.06 100 20 0.07 0  0.05 100 
EEX-DKE 9 0.09 1.9  0.05 100 21 0.08 0  0.07 100 
EEX-DKE 10 0.07 0  0.06 98.6 22 0.15 100  0.1 100 
EEX-DKE 11 0.06 0  0.07 88.4 23 0.14 100  0.1 100 
EEX-DKE 12 0.21 5  0.28 100 24 0.26 100  0.15 100 
             
EEX-DKW 1 0.09 100  0.01 97.8 13 0.04 0  0.01 99.9 
EEX-DKW 2 0.2 100  0.04 100 14 0.03 0  0.01 100 
EEX-DKW 3 0.29 100  0.06 100 15 0.04 0  0.01 100 
EEX-DKW 4 0.33 100  0.08 99.6 16 0.04 0  0.01 100 
EEX-DKW 5 0.27 100  0.05 100 17 0.04 0  0.01 99.6 
EEX-DKW 6 0.14 100  0.02 100 18 0.02 0  0.01 95.8 
EEX-DKW 7 0.07 100  0.01 99.7 19 0.01 0  0.01 98.8 
EEX-DKW 8 0.03 0  0.01 100 20 0.03 0  0.01 97 
EEX-DKW 9 0.05 0  0.01 100 21 0.02 0  0.01 100 
EEX-DKW 10 0.04 0  0.01 99.9 22 0.06 100  0.02 100 
EEX-DKW 11 0.03 0  0.01 100 23 0.04 0  0.01 100 
EEX-DKW 12 0.12 0.4  0.03 99.8 24 0.07 100  0.01 99.7 
             
PNX-OME 1 0.64 100  0.04 48.4 13 0.19 100  0.01 0 
PNX-OME 2 0.53 100  0.03 14.1 14 0.2 100  0.03 0.5 
PNX-OME 3 0.44 100  0.04 6.2 15 0.21 100  0.07 98.8 
PNX-OME 4 0.39 100  0.16 3.8 16 0.25 100  0.05 89 
PNX-OME 5 0.32 95.1  0.08 2.4 17 0.31 100  0.08 72.4 
PNX-OME 6 0.27 100  0.05 60.2 18 0.35 100  0.09 20.6 
PNX-OME 7 0.16 100  0.04 99.5 19 0.32 100  0.17 100 
PNX-OME 8 0.14 100  0.11 100 20 0.32 100  0.09 99.9 
PNX-OME 9 0.18 100  0.1 100 21 0.46 100  0.02 83.3 
PNX-OME 10 0.16 100  0.09 64.1 22 0.51 100  0.04 19.2 
PNX-OME 11 0.17 100  0.03 0.4 23 0.46 100  0.02 15.6 
PNX-OME 12 0.17 100  -0.06 0 24 0.36 100  0.01 92 
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Explanation: The number of observations in each series varies slightly from hour to hour due to missing values . 
 
Figure 13: Smoothed integration indicator tα̂  for the Polish-Czech (PPX-OTE) and the German-Czech 
(EEX-OTE) cross-border integration cases 
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Figure 14: Smoothed integration indicator tα̂  for the German-East Danish (EEX-DKE) and the French-
Spanish (PNX-OMEL) cross-border integration cases 
 
 
Figure 15: Smoothed integration indicator tα̂  for the German-Polish (EEX-PPX) and the German-
French (EEX-PNX) cross-border integration cases 
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Motivated both by liberalization ambitions to facilitate more extensive, efficient wholesale 
trading, and the system reliability benefits of wider integration, the operation of electricity 
interconnectors126 between separate markets is an active topic in both theoretical research and 
policy deliberations. International interconnections provide a number of benefits: substitution 
of less costly generation, the deferral of investment in generation, reductions in unserved 
energy, reductions in ancillary service costs, and the potential mitigation of market power.127
We also analyze another widely held view that market forces by themselves direct trading 
from a low- to a high-price area. The basic framework for devising financial transmission 
rights generally assumes this to be the case, following considerations of efficient arbitrage. 
However, we explore the circumstances in which an agent may choose to export power 
against the direction of efficient arbitrage. This result is a function of asymmetric market 
power and marginal costs between two regions. In reality, manifestations of this behavior are 
often elusive. In most markets it is sometimes difficult to associate physical power flows with 
trading because of the existence of loop flows in meshed, synchronized power systems. We 
use trading data from the Anglo-French Interconnector (IFA), the single, substantial but 
unsynchronized direct current link between these two markets that does not suffer from loop 
 
The system operations benefits of greater transmission capacities have been proven in 
practice, but the potential market efficiency effects still require extensive theoretical and 
empirical analyses. Despite the conventional wisdom that more interconnections create a 
larger market and encourage competition, increased market efficiency in theory (and 
presumably in practice) appears to depend upon the details of the mechanisms that are 
actually implemented. The interconnector literature has focused on financial transmission 
rights (Gilbert et al. (2004), Joskow and Tirole (2000)) and the effects of congestion in nodal 
pricing systems (e.g. Borenstein et al. (2000), Stoft (1999)). By contrast, the market power 
effects in explicit auction systems have not been studied empirically so far. It is from this 
perspective that the practical case study examined in this chapter seeks to add new insights. 
 
                                                 
125 I would like to thank Professor Derek Bunn for providing access to the unique data set of Anglo-French 
interconnector trades. 
126 We use “interconnector” as defined by Turvey (2006, p. 1457): “An interconnector, in the case of electricity, 
is a cable or overhead line connecting two separate markets or pricing areas.” 
127 Turvey (2006, p. 1457). 
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flow complications. From daily, company-level, flow-nomination data, we identify trades 
against the price differential that are consistent with the theoretically advantageous strategies 
available to some of the market participants. (This activity is in addition to the economic rents 
that dominant players can acquire via buying to withhold transmission rights.)  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, theoretical considerations for the 
exercise of market power in interconnector auctions are developed. In contrast, Section 3 
describes alternative explanations for market inefficiency that result from the practical 
implementation of these auctions. Section 4 introduces the data and Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications. 
 
V.2 Inefficient Export 
 
To begin, we envision a generating company that dominates its domestic market, but also 
generates in a foreign market. Both markets are linked through a limited capacity 
interconnector. Our hypothetical company sells electricity at the price ( )dd qp  in the domestic 
and at price ( )ff qp  in the foreign markets, whereby dq  represents the domestic and fq  the 
foreign sales. Its production cost function is ( )fd qqC + , and the profit function is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )dffffddd qqCqqpqqp +−+=Π .      (1) 
From the first order conditions, we deduce the well-known optimal third degree price 
discrimination rule128






















.     (2) 
We note that the domestic market’s optimal price is higher than in the foreign market 
( ( ) ( )** ffdd qpqp > ) if  





















∂ .        (3) 
                                                 
128 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1995, p.368 ff.). 
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Since the price depends negatively on the offered quantity, the domestic prices are, ceteris 
paribus, higher when, in equilibrium, either the company sells more in the domestic market 
( ** fd qq > ), or when prices react more strongly to volumes in the domestic market. Both 
conditions apply if the company dominates the domestic market and is a fringe player in the 
foreign market. In the extreme case, our company is a monopolist in the domestic market 
(residual demand curve = actual demand curve, i.e. almost vertical for electricity markets) and 
a price taker in the foreign market (residual demand curve is horizontal). Under these 
conditions, the foreign price serves as opportunity cost for domestic supplies. 
 
If we assume sufficient transmission capacities between both countries and production 
possible at cost ( )qCd  in the domestic and at ( )qC f  in the foreign markets, the production 
decision is independent of the share of total quantity sold in each market. Further, if there are 
significantly larger domestic than foreign inframarginal production capacities, but domestic 
prices are higher (for the reasons just mentioned), our monopolist would export against the 
price differential.129
We note that under certain conditions, a dominant generator may want to export electricity 
from the high- to the low-price area (by contrast, it benefits consumers and arbitragers to trade 
in the opposite direction). Prices will equalize absent trade barriers. However, limited 
interconnector transmission capacities will act as physical constraints. As transmission lines 
can only be used in one direction at a time and electricity is a homogenous good, the effect of 





                                                 
129 International trade influences the welfare distribution between domestic and foreign consumers and 
producers. The dominant generator will produce more in the domestic market if it can export; thus its marginal 
cost and domestic prices will increase and its domestic sales decrease. Domestic customers will lose welfare and 
the domestic company will gain. Foreign consumers will gain, partly at the expense of foreign suppliers. In 
addition to these direct welfare effects arising from flows against the price differentials, second order effects will 
decrease the system’s dynamic efficiency. For example, price signals for investments in the more competitive 
market will diminish. 
130 Essentially two procedures could handle counterflow nominations:  
Ex ante netting:  
(1) Market participants submit their flow nominations to the interconnector operator; (2) the operator balances 
imports and exports; (3a) if the balance is below the capacity constraint, all nominations are accepted and only 
the net flow materializes; (3b) if the balance is above the capacity constraint, electricity flows at full capacity in 
the net direction. All nominations against the dominant direction are accepted. In the dominant direction the 
operator allocates nominations to the market participants via auctions or pro rata. 
 
 At present, transmission rights between many EU countries are auctioned 
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separately in each direction, without any “netting” (i.e. cancellation of positive and negative 
flow nominations).  
 
Assuming an interconnector of fixed131 k capacity  between an oligopolistic domestic market 
with pricing function oo Qp −=1  and an adjacent foreign competitive market with 0≥cp , we 
can show that 
1) A dominant will nominate electricity against the price differential 
2) If all acquired transmission rights must be used (no withholding), the electricity flow 
direction depends on the number of traders 
3) Irrespective of the number of traders, a dominant will buy all importation rights and 
withhold them (if allowed) and electricity will flow against the price differential. 
 
 Next, we look at a dominant M in the oligopolistic market that can produce up to a capacity 
of 1>+≥ fd qqQ  with zero cost. Additionally n  symmetric traders nTT 1  exist. All 
companies can buy and sell in both markets with jI  being the net imports of trader j . We can 























1        (5) 
Absent congestion, all players will behave in the oligopolistic market as oligopolists with cost 




















converges to the price in the competitive market if more traders enter. Because of its cost 
advantage, the dominant will sell all of its remaining production df qQq −=  in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
No netting:  
(1) Market participants submit their flow nominations to the operator; (2) In each direction only nominations up 
to the line capacity are allowed. Thus, the capacity in each direction is allocated separately to the respective 
bidders via auctions or pro rata. No electricity will flow if export and import demand are higher than the line 
capacity. 
131 We assume fixed capacity in contrast to Hoeffler and Wittmann (2006) who assume the capacity to be chosen 
by a profit maximizing auctioneer. 
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, electricity will flow from the high- to the low- 
price area. 
 
If congestion is present ( dqQk −< ), the capacities are auctioned separately in each direction, 






, because the traders will buy all 





, and the dominant will buy all exportation rights 
and export at kq f = .  
 
Will it profit the dominant if it is allowed to buy importation rights but not use them 
(withholding)? Assuming an auction for the importation rights, this is equivalent to asking 
whether the dominant has a higher marginal willingness than traders to pay for the 
























Π∂ 11  it follows that ( ) cid pInq −+−> 112 . 
Because congestion is present, the dominant need not react to the traders’ volumes, and its 






pnIq −−= . Thus, it will buy and withhold all importation rights as 
long as ( ) cici pInpnI −+−>−− 111 . This holds for any number of traders.132
                                                 
132 Note that the price of export rights should be zero because only the dominant desires to export. The price of 













CO pkPP , i.e. between the dominant’s and the trader’s 
maximum willingness to pay, depending on the auction mechanism. 
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Given a low-cost dominant in the domestic market with capacity constraint access to a more 
competitive foreign market, and the previous theoretical analysis, we expect to observe the 
following market characteristics:  
1) A dominant generator may be observed in practice to be exporting against the price 
differential, but not importing against the price differential.  
2) A trader should always trade from the low- to the high-price area and thus sometimes 
against the dominant’s trading direction.  
3) If withholding is allowed, the dominant will only withhold import rights.  
4) Traders will not withhold transmission rights.  
 
In reality, of course, electricity markets are complex and dynamic. For example, a producer 
may be a “natural” monopolist during off-peak but an oligopolist during on-peak. 
Nevertheless, by having a capacity-constrained link between a concentrated market with an 
occasionally low-cost dominant and an occasionally more competitive market, we can deduce 
and test these two hypotheses:  
1) The dominant will behave asymmetrically, predominantly withholding in the import 
direction and trading against the price differential mainly in the export direction.  
2) The dominant will behave quite differently from the non-dominant generators and 
traders. 
The analysis above is consistent with a general view (e.g. Bonardi (2004)) that after 
deregulation, dominant incumbents usually seek to maximize monopoly rents at home while 
acting opportunistically abroad. 
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V.3 Auction Mechanisms and Microstructure Effects  
 
Aside from the use of market power by dominant participants, studies of the performance of 
capacity auctions for allocating interconnector transmission rights have discussed the 
inefficiencies that result from market design and microstructure effects. In Europe, where ex 
ante auctions are the prevailing cross-border congestion management scheme between 
separate power markets which, for political, proprietary, regulatory or other reasons cannot be 
easily unified into extended nodal pricing regions, ETSO (2004), CONSENTEC (2004) and 
the EC (2007), among others, have examined design effectiveness. Auctions for 
interconnector capacity may take place annually, quarterly and weekly for blocks of time, and 
then close with day-ahead prices. If they work well, the interconnectors will operate to 
capacity at prices that reflect the arbitrage value of trading physical power between the two 
connected spot markets. But this has not generally been the case, and experts have identified 
several concerns: 
1) In most cases, apart from the single Anglo-French link, a meshed system makes 
calculating the available capacities at each link a challenging task. Significant security 
margins must be included, reducing the real transmission capacity and according to 
Glachant and Pignon (2005, p. 153), “TSOs, therefore, define the congestion signal on a 
variable, complex and non-transparent constraint and may manipulate it”. Hoeffler and 
Wittmann (2006) suggest that profit maximizing auctioneers in such auctions would lead 
to welfare losses. 
2) The sequence of transmission and energy markets produces uncertainty. The 
transmission auctions usually precede the energy markets. As shown empirically in 
Chapter IV and theoretically by Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005), prediction errors in the 
market spreads lead to inefficient prices in the prior transmission capacity auctions. These 
temporal uncertainties can be further confounded by the varied closing times for the 
energy spot markets.  
3) Flows are usually permitted to be nominated up to their physical capacity in each 
direction, without fully considering how counter-nominations will reduce the net flows. 
Thus, separate auctions of capacity in both directions may fail to induce full 
interconnector usage.  
4) Some market mechanisms do not require participants to return the forward capacity 
reservations which they do not intend to use the next day to the day-ahead market. 
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5) Markets may not be sufficiently liquid to induce efficient prices. Spot prices may be 
easily moved by small trades and traders may lack confidence that they can close out final 
positions at a fair price. 
6) System operators on one or both sides of a link may need to be proactive in scheduling 
cross-border flows for congestion and system balancing purposes. These activities would 
generally be expected to take place the day after the trading markets close, and constitute 
a further reason why substantial capacity is withheld from the market. 
7) The major reference prices may not fully reflect locational prices for taking or 
delivering power at the ends of the interconnectors. Even without nodal prices, there may 
be different locational supplements to reflect system losses.  
8) Local congestion close to the ends of a link can induce local generators to anticipate 
domestic output constraints and compensate by nominating some power for export.  
9) Electricity may not be a homogenous commodity on one or both sides of a link. Some 
countries have special supplements for delivering power from renewable sources, e.g. the 
Netherlands and the UK. These would not be apparent in the wholesale market prices, and 
the non-transparency of “green” volumes could distort the implied direction of arbitrage. 
 
All of these issues, with the exception of the last two, will similarly affect all market 
participants. The main propositions which we identified in section 2 concern differences in 
the interconnector usage of dominant and non-dominant companies. With microstructure 
effects affecting both types of companies similarly, an empirically based analysis of distinct 
dominant behavior may still be possible. 
 
V.4 Data from the Anglo-French Interconnector 
 
The Anglo-French Interconnector (IFA) consists of four 45 km submarine DC cables between 
Calais and Folkstone that allow transmission of 2000 MW in either direction. It is jointly 
operated by the French Réseau de transport d’électricité (RTE) and UK National Grid (NG) 
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transmission system operators.133 In 2005 the absolute electricity flows totaled 12 TWh, and 
traders were willing to pay more than € 125 m for the usage of this vital link.134
(a) Electricity Price Data 
 
 
The economics of the IFA have not yet been extensively studied. Inderst and Ottaviani (2004) 
provide a general description of the linked markets, the auctioning mechanism, and IFA’s 
ownership, but they do not make use of the extensive, publicly available data to analyze 
whether the IFA actually achieves efficient arbitrage. Turvey (2006) provides some graphical 
indication that the electricity exports from France to the UK are occasionally directed against 
the price difference, as does the EC Sector Inquiry (2007), while CONSENTEC (2004) shows 
that the link between price differential and flows is significant but low.  
 
We select three datasets: the electricity spot prices on both sides of the IFA, the results of the 
IFA-capacity auctions and the IFA-flow nominations. Our sample period consists of 1,011 
working days from 2002 to 2005.  
 
We obtained hourly wholesale electricity prices for France from PNX and downloaded the 
half hourly electricity prices for UKPX from Datastream. Since both countries did not apply 
locational pricing, we apply a single price for each country. We note that a substantial 
shortcoming of the data is the low liquidity of both markets. Only about 2% of the national 
electricity consumption is traded on the UKPX and just over 3% on the PNX.135
                                                 
133 This has led to discussions in the UK about how to properly regulate the interconnector, since French law 
does not allow Ofgem to regulate RTE. [DTI (2005)] 
134 “Absolute flows” refers to 11.4 TWh imports to the UK and 0.8 TWh exports from the UK. The presented 
figure for the willingness to pay only accounts for annual (800 MW), seasonal (300 MW), quarterly (300 MW) 
and monthly (350 MW) auctions and is thus ignoring weekend and daily auctions.  
 In fact, more 
spot trading in the UK takes place via brokers (OTC trade accounts for about 9%) than via the 
UKPX (see the Appendix for a comparison of OTC and UKPX prices). We find that price 
deviations between OTC and power exchange are insignificant during both base and on-peak 
periods. In contrast to the UKPX where trading takes place continually until one hour ahead 
of real time, the PNX applies a one-shot auction the day before delivery. This raises the 
question of whether the ex post price differential is a valid measure for the efficiency of 
traders’ arbitrage operations. One could surmise that at the margin a profitable deal in the 
day-ahead market (e.g. buy in France at the French price p(F,t) and sell in the UK at the 
135 EC (2007). 
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British price p(UK,t)>p(F,t)) is ex post unprofitable since the UKPX price may fall somewhat 
after the completion of the deal. Even if this effect was noticeable and traders were unable to 
forecast it, this bias is a minor concern for our analysis, because it would occur symmetrically 
in both directions and affect all market participants. 
Figure 16: Average electricity prices at each hour of the day 2002-2005 (in €/MWh) 
 
 
Another concern is the associated transaction cost. It consists of (at least) five components for 
the IFA:  
1) Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges: Depending on the market 
situation these costs can change from day to day; the underlying cost-formula depends on 
several factors. It is difficult both to forecast and to assess their influence on traders’ 
transaction costs; therefore, we do not include them in our analysis. 
2) Balancing market (ELEXON) participation fees: These are independent of traded 
volumes and thus unimportant for our analysis. However, they may create a barrier to 
entry.  
3) A symmetric loss factor of 1.17% is applied for all IFA flow nominations, i.e. when 
withdrawing 100.00 MWh in market A, one must feed 101.17 MWh into market B. In all 
subsequent analysis we account for the loss factor.  
4) Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges: These unpredictable charges 
differ when bringing electricity from England to France (TNUoS Demand) and in the 
opposite direction (TNUoS Generation). An interconnector user only pays the TNUoS 
Demand Pass Through Charge when both it and the entire IFA nominate electricity to 
France during at least one of three “Triad Charging Half Hour Periods”136
                                                 
136 They are the three ex post deduced periods of highest electricity peak demand from November to February. 
Note that each of these Triad Charging Half Hour Periods must be separated by at least 10 days from the 
previous one. 
. The individual 
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charge is then calculated according to average interconnector imports during the three 
Triad Periods times the Zonal Demand Tariff (ZDT)137
5) Capacity charge for obtaining unidirectional transmission rights (this is the main 
capacity auction price): The capacity at the IFA is sold to interested parties via a sequence 
of auctions. 
 times the individual share of the 
Triad imports. We approximate the effect of this charge as expected importing cost 
(ZDT/(number of potential half hours)) in £/MWh for the on-peak half hours with 
significantly above average on-peak prices in winter months. The TNUoS Generation 
Charge is levied on export (France to the UK) capacity holders. The total payable amount 
of £ 2,630,056.41 (2005/06) is distributed to the users according to their export capacity 
holdings. Assuming 90% of the available capacity being allocated (not ultimately used), 
each export capacity holder must bear 0.17 £/MWh of its export capacity held. We include 
this charge in our analysis.  
Table 29 indicates that auction results (ignoring daily auctions) are quite 
volatile, ranging from 4.3 to 22.5 €/MWh for exports and 0.43 to 1.26 €/MWh for 
imports.138
Table 29
 A variety of players enter most of the bids in one auction (number of winning 
bids in brackets). We note that the distribution of the total volume for the products offered 
at the auctions varies in our sample period. Therefore  is not representative for 
the entire sample period.  
 
Table 29: Summary of products and prices at the IFA 
Product Auction Date  F to UK 
Volume in 




UK to F 
Volume in 




Daily: 10Apr06 9Apr06 50 9.88 (0.13139 150 ) 9.83 
Weekend: 8-9Apr06 7Apr06 100 17.5 0 0 
Monthly: 4/2006 9Mar06 150 (4) 6.28 150 (5) 0.74 
21Mar06 150 (6) 10.77 150 (4) 0.55 
Quarterly: 4/06-6/06 16Mar06 150 (4) 7.50 150 (4) 0.61 
7Mar06 150 (6) 6.30 150 (5) 1.22 
Seasonal: Summer06 
 
2Mar06 175 (6) 4.28 175 (5) 1.26 
14Mar06 175 (4) 6.83 175 (4) 0.71 
Annual (Apr-Mar): 
4/06-3/07 
7Feb06 175 (6) 15.76 175 (6) 0.61 
28Feb06 175 (6) 9.00 175 (4) 0.77 
Annual (Jan-Dec): 8Nov05 250 (7) 16.50 250 (4) 0.43 
                                                 
137 2005-2006 in the South-East, Zone 11: 15,989.41 £/MWh. 
138 In this dissertation, we define import and export with respect to France, i.e. bringing electricity from France to 
the UK is defined as export. 
139 We report the second price because it differed significantly from the first price. In all other cases, the prices of 
all winning bids differed by only a few cents/MWh. 
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2006 29Nov05 250 (7) 22.50 250 (8) 0.47 
 
 (b) Transmission Capacity Auction Prices and Volumes 
 
All auction data are obtained from the French grid operator RTE which provides extensive 
coverage of the IFA data on its website.140
Figure 17
 In general, day-ahead prices for imports to France 
(avg.: 0.5 €/MWh) are lower than for exports to the UK (avg.: 2.0 €/MWh).  shows 
that the variances of the day-ahead price series are highly clustered and that imports are 
generally more expensive in winter. The significant spike in 2003 is explained by the very 
high import prices on the Continent during that extraordinarily hot summer.  
 
When comparing the prices, the frequency of large differences between auctions for the same 
period are particularly striking (e.g. the prices of the two import auctions for 2006 held on 8th 
and 29th of November 2005 differ by 36%)141
Table 30
. These differences make it unlikely that the 
results are only based on a change of expectations or the open positions of the individual 
players. It may be that in some circumstances the auction mechanism (see ) and the 
limited number of participants allow traders to conceal their true willingness to pay and thus 
achieve lower prices. The open bid auction explains why the winning bids are so close (e.g., 
for the annual auction of 8th November, the winning bids were: 144.5, 144.3, 144.25, 144.2, 
144.15, 144.12 and 144.1 thousand Euro, i.e. in the range of 0.2%).142
                                                 
140 http://www.rte-france.com/htm/fr/vie/historiques_angleterre.jsp 
141 Practitioners link this increase to the coinciding gas price increases: the NBP price of UK gas futures for 2006 
increased from 53.5 to 61 pence per therm (14%) in the same period. 
142 Due to the importance of periodic auctions (90% of the volumes) and their rather uncommon structure, the 
auction mechanism is briefly introduced. The auctions are held several weeks before the beginning of the 
delivery period. After the opening of the auction, bids may be entered for 15-30 minutes. After the first 15 
minutes, the auction closes at a randomly selected point in the next 15 minutes. The auction can be repeatedly 
extended by 2 minutes, when new bids (of a certain minimum bid size) are entered. In addition, a certain 




Figure 17: Results of daily auctions of capacities of the Anglo-French Interconnector 




IFA-export daily price in €/MWh




IFA-import daily price in €/MWh
 
Table 30: Comparison of the IFA and the German-Dutch interconnector 
 IFA TenneT (RWE-TenneT) 
Auction price setting Discriminatory (pay as bid) uniform price (last accepted offer) 
Auction mechanism Open bid Sealed bid 
Closing time of 
periodical auctions 
random closing within a 15 min. 
range  
fixed closing  
Closing time of day-
ahead auctions 
8.15 9.00 
Closing time of the 
linked spot markets 
PNX: day ahead 11.00 am 
UKPX: hour ahead  
APX: day ahead 10.30 am 
EEX: day ahead 12.00 am 
Usage requirements Capacity not nominated in t-1 is 
given back to the daily auction 
Capacity not nominated in t-1 is 
given back to the daily auction 
Number of products 7 (see Table 29) 3 (annual, monthly, daily) 
Daily products Base 24 single hours 
Reselling Allowed, but uncommon143 Allowed  
Netting No No 
Intraday market No No 
 Only DC link between two 
asynchronous systems 
Part of a meshed synchronous AC 
grid 
 contract transmission path = 
physical transmission path 
contract transmission path =/= 
physical transmission path 
 
                                                 
143 RTE has established a corresponding trading platform that is apparently not as popular with traders. 
[www.rte-france.com/htm/fr/offre/telecharge/Recapitulatif_des_reponses_clients_pour_WEB.pdf (25Apr06)] 
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(c) Company Level Data on IFA Usage 
 
Our third dataset consists of half hourly company level data on IFA usage. In our sample 
period, 27 companies actively traded across the English Channel. The usage is modestly 
concentrated (See Figure 19). The five largest players in the IFA market together account for 
72% of the exports (Herfendale-Hirshman Index (HHI) of 1570) and 71% of the imports 
(HHI: 1155). But the linked energy markets are quite disparate. Electricité de France 
dominates the French market (over 90% market share) while the UK market is characterized 
by many generators (HHI: below 900). Figure 18 indicates that electricity mainly flows from 
France to the UK in off-peak periods and in both directions in on-peak periods with almost 
equal probability.  
 
Figure 18: Aggregated flows (daily pattern in MWh) 
 
 
Figure 19: Company level usage144






IFA utilisation in TWh
         
Total export volumes (F=>UK)




                                                 
144 See the Appendix for a list of companies. 
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V.5 Empirical Analysis 
 
Figure 20 plots the physical electricity exchange between the UK and France versus the 
corresponding price difference for representative off-peak (3h) and on-peak hours (13h). 
During off-peak, electricity flows from France to the UK in 86% of the 1,011 considered 
hours. Electricity is thus usually flowing from the low- to the high-price area, but the capacity 
is rarely fully utilized even when significant price differentials persist. 
While electricity flows in the “right” direction 84% of the time during off-peak, it flows 
against the price differential around 40% of the time during on-peak. The seemingly random 
distribution of the dots in the second part of Figure 20 indicates that the statistical link 
between flows and price differential is very weak during on-peak times (correlation 
coefficient is 17%). 
Figure 20: Physical exchange vs. price difference 
 
 
To capture the physical exchange/price differential, we create an inefficiency indicator. For 
each hour we calculate the product of the arbitrage potential145 and the unused capacity in the 
profitable direction146 and find a positive value in Euros. In the extreme case, high price 
differentials persist even though much of the capacity remains unused. When price 
differentials are zero or the capacity is fully utilized in the arbitrage direction, the 
inefficiencies are zero by definition.147 This gives a static value of the unused capacity.148
                                                 
145 The arbitrage potential is the price differential accounting for the loss factor and the TNUoS charges. 
146 Note that the unused capacity can even exceed the total capacity when the IFA is used against the market 
force.  
147 Observations where flows are exactly zero are assumed to indicate that unused capacities are zero due to 
technical disruptions, e.g. maintenance, accident or flow switching. 
 We 
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plot the daily results of this indicator (see Figure 21), indicating that the inefficiencies are 
rather volatile and occasionally spike when prices in France or the UK are unusually high. 
(Total inefficiencies were € 289 m between 2002 and 2005.) Most inefficiency at the IFA 
occurs when the price differential suggests that France should import electricity (€ 200 m). 
However, this rarely occurs, and electricity is traded against the market force. 
Figure 21: Inefficiency indicator 





Daily Unused Import Arbitrage Potential in Thousand €
Average= 198 T€/day





Daily Unused Export Arbitrage Potential in Thousand €
Average= 88 T€/day
 
We suggest the following five causes for the capacity under-usage we observe in the IFA:  
1) Either the French or the UK power exchange does not provide the relevant price 
signals for their respective markets.149




3) The absence of netting: the unused capacity due to netting is the capacity in the flow 
direction that can additionally be freed when flows in the opposite direction are 
considered. Overall, 808 GWh importing capacity worth € 6.6 m and 816 GWh exporting 




4) Strategic players may intentionally trade against the price differential to influence 
prices.  
 However, this is only slightly more than one percent of the total capacity 
in each direction. 
5) Companies block capacities by neither using nor returning acquired transmission 
rights.  
                                                                                                                                                        
148 Note that the true value should be lower because the correct usage of the IFA would result in price 
convergence. 
149 The reasons are inter alia the trading dynamics, transaction costs, hidden locational pricing and green power 
support schemes.  
150 Risk aversion of traders in explicit auctions is an issue. As traders sequentially have to buy capacity buy 
electricity in one market, and sell the electricity in another, they need to hold open positions. Only when they 
accomplish the last of the three operations will they know how much they earned/lost. 
151 The value is computed with respect to the corresponding arbitrage potential. 
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The last two points are closely related to the testable propositions suggested in Section 2. 




Although the use it or lose it principle is theoretically implemented via the requirement of a 
day-ahead (6:00 a.m.) Confirmation And Reallocation notice (CAR notice), it remains unclear 
whether this notice has any binding power. If a trader announces its intention to use the entire 
capacity acquired in periodic auctions, it will not be forced to return any unused capacity to 
the auctioneer who would otherwise reallocate it in the daily auctions.152
Figure 22: Volumes offered in daily IFA auctions 
 In reality, the 
capacities are seldom returned. Despite the underused capacity in both directions, the 
capacities at the daily auction are rarely larger than the size of the custom auction, indicating 
that no capacity has been returned to the auctioneer (see Figure 7). At this point, there are two 
reservations: First, deviations from the use it or lose it principle are not necessarily faulty 
since they may, for example, give traders increased flexibility. Second, a portion of this 
apparent withholding may be due to the daily nature of the auction. If, for example, a trader 
intends to use a certain capacity only in a single half-hour of the day, the remaining 47 half-
hours cannot be sold in daily auctions. 
 




IFA-export daily volume in MW




IFA-import daily volume in MW
 
 
The magnitude of withholding can only be studied by learning the share of the transmission 
rights each company owns. Unfortunately for researchers, this data is non-public. But given 
                                                 
152 “If Users notify the operators around 36 hours in advance that surplus capacity is not required, it will be 
offered in the daily auction and if sold, the User will receive the proceeds (with some adjustments). However, in 
order to avoid blocking, if capacity is neither used nor notified as not required, it will be lost - the principle of 
‘Use It or Lose It’.” [Frequently Asked Questions Website of National Grid on the IFA]. The question is who 
will then use such “lost capacities”. The firmly binding capacity notifications are the so-called Mid Channel 
Nominations. Those must be submitted at 11:00 p.m. (d-1) i.e., after the end of the daily auctions. 
 93 
the infrequency of secondary market operations involving the IFA-capacity rights, we can 
approximate the companies’ capacity rights by using their half-hourly IFA nominations. The 
idea is that the maximal nomination of a month minus the volume of the daily auction is the 
lower bound for the quantity of capacity rights a company holds in that month. We calculate 
this monthly quantity for each company.  
Figure 23: Withholding by the eleven largest interconnector users 






Share of Profitable Import Capacities not Used






Share of Profitable Export Capacities not Used
 
 
The value of withheld capacities (weighted with the arbitrage potential) is significant and 
totals € 65 m in exports and € 100 m in imports. Further checking confirms that this value is 
consistent for exports since the total capacity owned by companies averages 1400 MW, and 
for only one month surpasses the 2000 MW threshold. For imports however, we estimate the 
total capacity owned is only 740 MW (because some capacities are never fully utilized, even 
though all are sold). Thus, we know that some companies own these importation rights 
without either using them or returning them to the auctioneer.  
 
Figure 23 indicates that the share of import rights (75%) significantly exceeds the share of 
export rights (40%) that are not used despite being profitable. The British Powergen (PGEN) 
– an affiliate of the German E.ON – and the French Electricité de France (EDEF) are the 
players that forfeit the highest share of profitable import rights. As the French and German 
markets are rather concentrated the results for PGEN and EDEF are in line with the 
hypothesis that those companies have the strongest interest to withhold import rights to 
protect their domestic markets. In fact, both types of predicted withholding asymmetries 
occur: The two companies withhold a higher share of profitable import rights than their peer 
group and they withhold more import than export rights (even when corrected for the 
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common bias)153
(b) Trade against the Price Differential 
. An alternative explanation however is that EDEF and PGEN prefer to own 
some import rights as assurance against becoming short in their domestic market. Although, 
both companies might have an interest in owning abundant import rights, not using them fully 
raises an issue of profit management. 
 
 
Exporting against arbitrage occurs more frequently than over-importation. This coincides with 
our theoretical analysis in Section 2 (continental European electricity markets are 
substantially more concentrated than the UK market). However, various alternative 
explanations for the irregular flows must be considered.  
 
First, IFA-flows may be partially driven by intra-country dispatching considerations. Here it 
is worth noting that northern France is an exporting area with installed capacity exceeding 
local demand, whereas southeast England (including Greater London) is an importing area. 
There is no substantial evidence that significant congestion exists in northern France to 
restrict the output of plants in the region. London Economics (2007) did not identify this as a 
reason for the reduced outputs of French nuclear plants. There is evidence of system operator-
motivated trades against the price differential for balancing purposes, but not of generators 
making inefficient nominations in the expectation of being constrained. 
 
Second, Trading dynamics may be responsible for the ex post impression of flow nominations 
against the price differential. This, however, fails to justify why over-exportation is much 
more widespread than over-importation.  
 
Third, Because of the UK’s green power support schemes, continental companies could desire 
to export electricity from France to the UK even if the French wholesale prices are higher. In 
the UK, commercial electricity consumers usually must pay a Climate Change Levy (CCL) on 
each unit of electricity consumed (4.3 £/MWh in 2005). An exemption is granted if a supplier 
can show that the electricity consumed was produced from renewable sources. For this 
                                                 
153 The five companies with above average ratio of Share of import rights withholding divided by share of export 
rights withholding are: BKWE, SEME, PGEN, ELEE and EDEF. 
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purpose, Levy Exemption Certificates (LECs) are issued for each MWh of green electricity 
generated and consumed under this scheme. Foreign plants can also produce these LECs if the 
electricity is generated according to the rules and consumed within the UK. The foreign 
generator must assure the UK regulator that the corresponding amount of green electricity was 
produced by the certified power station and that the company has credible transmission access 
from the green source to the UK’s consumers. Estimates indicate that on average about a 
quarter154
Fourth, to explore whether strategic considerations are partly driving the over-export, it is 
helpful to identify whether only specific companies (low-cost domestic dominants) tend to 
occasionally over-export both with respect to their peer group and to their own over-imports. 
The company level flow nominations do reveal some irregular behaviors. In the previous 
section, we identified EDEF and PGEN as the two companies with the highest share of 
unused import capacities. In addition, both companies are found to over-export significantly 
more than they over-import: Whilst for the entire sample the ratio of exports against the price 
differential to imports against the price differential is 5.57, it is 16.95 for EDEF and 14.08 for 
PGEN. Thus, we test whether the trading decisions of EDEF and PGEN are significantly 
different from those of the other companies. We establish a binary-variable, panel-data model 
of each company-level import/export decision (with 
 of the IFA’s import capacity should have been used for such “green power flows”, 
but given the nature of renewables, the output profile is variable. The trades are not tagged, 
however, and the generators are only required to produce aggregate monthly accounts. Thus, 
the LECs are not necessarily linked as supplements to the energy price spreads in specific 
trading periods. Unless generators claim a large fraction of LECs in their total exported power 
to the UK, it does not appear that this necessarily motivates inefficient arbitrage. Therefore, 
the manifest effect that electricity flows into the UK against the price differential could be due 
to the additional exportation incentives from the continental LECs. Yet the nature of the LEC-
accounting suggests this is an insufficient reason.  
 
, 1i tT = standing for an export and , 0i tT =  
for an import)155
tititittti DpDpDT ,,,, εηγηγββαα +++∆+∆++=
∆∆∆
:  
    (7) 
                                                 
154 Source: Ofgem’s Website. On average 458 MWh of LECs were produced in each hour between April 2004 
and October 2006. Of these, Electricité de France held 19%, E.ON 2% and RWE 2%, with the remainder being 
widely distributed. 
155 For each company, all dates where this company did not trade the interconnector were excluded from the 
sample. 
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In (7), each trading decision depends on a common constant (α ), the common impact of the 
price differentials  ( )tpβ∆  and the common impact of the trading decisions of all other 
companies ( )ti,ηγ . Thereby, ti,η  is the sum of trading decisions of all other companies not 
explained by the price differential, i.e. the residual vector of the ancillary (ordinary) 




tjti TST ,, . To identify the deviations of EDEF and 
PGEN from the average trading strategy, the three terms, Dα∆ , tD pβ
∆ ∆  and tiD ,ηγ
∆ , are 
included in the logit estimation. Thus, D  is a Dummy vector with ones for i being EDEF or 
PGEN and zeros otherwise. Testing whether those two companies’ behavior deviate from the 
average trading strategy is carried out by checking if either some or all of the group-specific 
coefficients (α∆ , β ∆ ,γ ∆ ) are significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 31: Results of the panel-data logit model of each company-level import/export decision 
Variable       Coefficient       t-statistic     t-probability 
α  -0.063 -5.648 0.000 
α∆  1.468 57.575 0.000 
β  0.043 82.436 0.000 
β ∆  -0.014 -14.918 0.000 
γ  0.441 179.397 0.000 
γ ∆  -0.118 -23.318 0.000 
McFadden R-squared  =     0.5869  
LR-ratio, 2*(Lu-Lr)  =  106,471  
Log-Likelihood   =  -37,463  
Number of observations =  153,830 
number of variables                 =  6  
Number of 0's;       =   42,532 
Number of 1's    =  111,298  
 
The results in Table 31 provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that the two companies’ 
trading behaviors deviate markedly from the average strategy: in contrast to the average 
trader, EDEF and PGEN feature significant exports unexplained by price differentials and 
common trading decisions (α∆ = 1.47***); they react less on prices than their competitors 
( β ∆ =-0.014***) and trade less in line with the trading decision off all other companies (γ ∆ =-
0.118***). This implies that those two companies’ trading decisions are particularly affected 
by company-specific considerations that overrule pure electricity market arbitrage incentives. 
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The result that EDEF significantly over-exports confirms empirical evidence consistent with 
the model we present in Section 2. We reiterate the following points: 
1) EDEF is a quasi-monopolist in France (~90% of generation) and a small player in the 
UK (~9%).156
2) The UK market is generally considered more competitive than the French market.  
 Further, the French market is price sensitive to the interconnector volumes 
(London Economics, 2007). 
3) EDEF’s generation costs (mainly nuclear) are occasionally considerably lower than 
UK prices.157
In sum, our theoretical possibility that dominant companies can indeed over-export from the 
Continent and that electricity may thereby flow from the high- to the low-price area is 
plausible. Overall, it appears that some local congestion may motivate nominations, and that 
the benefits of green CCL-exempt supplements encourage a significant amount of trading. 
Taken together, they do not appear to offer a complete explanation for the amount of 
inefficient arbitrage. This leaves room for the theoretically attractive explanation of dominant 
market power for which our empirical evidence is circumstantially persuasive. In this context, 
the Sector Inquiry of the European Commission (EC, 2007) contains a relevant pricing 
sensitivity analysis by London Economics, which faced difficulties in reconciling the declared 
and actual output of Electricité de France’s nuclear plants, and in the end concluded, “one 
must consider the possibility that this company has engaged in behavior consistent with the 
systematic withdrawal of nuclear capacity in this market” (EC, 2007, p.252). 
 
  
                                                 
156 Electricité de France considers itself as being willing and able to profitably withhold. When Pierre Gadonneix 
(Chair and Chief executive officer of Electricité de France) presented the Consolidated Annual Results of 2005, 
he explicitly asserted that “Priority is given to margin against market share” 
[http://www.edf.fr/70945d/Homecom/Press/BookPresseRA20030226VAPDF]. 




Whether the reason for inefficient arbitrage across the IFA is local congestion in northern 
France, the UK Climate Change Levy Exemptions, or the dominant behavior of Electricité de 
France, or more likely a mix of all three, it is apparent that expecting transparent market 
efficiency in the relationship of auction prices to energy spot market spreads is too ambitious. 
The sequential nature of the transmission capacity auctions and spot energy trading 
undermine the simple arbitrage relationship; the presence of obscure green supplements 
differentiates the commodity; and locational factors differentiate the cost of access to markets. 
Against this background, we suggest that it is quite difficult for regulatory authorities to 
monitor conduct. We observe that conduct can be an issue in these auctions, not just through 
capacity withholding, but through inefficient arbitrage with a dominant generator, under 
special circumstances, creating electricity flows from a high- to a low-price area. As the 
special circumstances of the analysis are satisfied in the case of the IFA, we provide evidence 
that such flow reversions do occur in reality. We also show that the dominant French 
generator is apparently exporting electricity to the UK, despite French prices appearing to be 
higher, while most other players trade in the opposite direction. There are several possible 
explanations, with the circumstantial appeal of market conduct being rather persuasive. 
 
The total inefficiencies of under-using or misusing the IFA amounted to € 289 m over this 
four-year period. The largest share was due to intentional or accidental withholding. We were 
able to show that a significant amount of physical transmission rights (worth € 100 m in 
importing and € 65 m in exporting directions) was bought but neither used nor returned to the 
auctioneer. This is evidence that the use it or lose it principle is not properly applied in the 
IFA. Another source of inefficiencies – the lack of ex ante netting – had minor effects. Only 
808 GWh importing capacity worth € 6.6 m and 816 GWh exporting capacity worth € 2.9 m 
could have been released by ex ante netting in the years 2002 to 2005.  
 
Finally, we note that a substantial part of these inefficiencies occur because the energy and 
transmission markets are decoupled through the ex ante nature of the capacity auctions. 
Implicit auction approaches with nodal pricing and harmonized pricing of renewable power 
would preclude the inefficiencies we identify. However, these could also be achieved in an ex 
ante auction setting by enforcing the use it or lose it principle, allowing ex ante netting and 
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increasing the number of traders. Thus, despite the vulnerability of explicit ex ante auctions to 
the inefficiencies we identify, they may be the most pragmatic method initially to implement 
interconnector trading. However, the design of the market mechanism, harmonization, 
monitoring and liquidity incentives requires careful thought and attention. 
 
V.7 Appendix 




nominations   
Total export 
nominations 
in MWh    
Avg. export 
nomination 
in MWh   
No. of 
import 
nominations   
Total import 
nominations 
in MWh    
Avg. import 
nomination 
in MWh   
ACCE 8,686 1,267,968 146.0 5,504 847,178 153.9 
ARON 2,137 167,835 78.5 59 3,595 60.9 
AELE 771 70,719 91.7 24 2,132 88.8 
AEPE 3,415 661,461 193.7 2,148 345,238 160.7 
AXIE 10,668 2,067,320 193.8 5,482 1,259,711 229.8 
BARB 8,313 1,650,806 198.6 4,291 913,155 212.8 
BKWE 5,781 764,245 132.2 1,041 78,042 75.0 
BHPB 0 0  12 612 51.0 
BPGE 1,242 76,185 61.3 152 9,296 61.2 
CARE 2 2 0.8 177 14,029 79.3 
DUKE 100 4,900 49.0 48 3,060 63.8 
DYNE 1,221 65,153 53.4 463 27,625 59.7 
EDEF 14,193 6,606,480 465.5 3,378 725,144 214.7 
ELEE 8,350 614,233 73.6 2,761 158,405 57.4 
FHCE 462 36,957 80.0 280 24,868 88.8 
INNE 6,331 551,856 87.2 3,914 390,220 99.7 
GASE 3,377 248,941 73.7 290 19,192 66.2 
LPAS 154 13,185 85.6 1,086 161,810 149.0 
MSCG 0 0  586 24,398 41.6 
PGEN 8,771 581,831 66.3 1,124 66,572 59.2 
SEME 10,643 1,053,666 99.0 4,596 261,220 56.8 
SETL 3,477 347,502 99.9 791 49,289 62.3 
STAT 2,463 168,649 68.5 1,004 62,501 62.3 
TFEE 12,791 3,145,247 245.9 4,056 883,895 217.9 
TXUE 1,972 248,395 126.0 1,220 151,467 124.2 
VATT 448 23,890 53.3 381 15,247 40.0 
WILE 0 0  24 1,800 75.0 
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Figure 24: Comparison of UK over-the-counter and power exchange prices 








UK on-peak electricity prices













Table 33: Summary statistics 
 Mean Variance Minimum Maximum 
PNX electricity price in the 3rd hour 19.4 77 0.5 66 
PNX electricity price in the 13th hour 46.8 1,486 7.9 1,000.1 
UKPX electricity price in the 3rd hour 25.4 96 5.2 86.7 
UKPX electricity price in the 13th hour 45 785 19.3 399.3 
Interconnector usage volumes in the 3rd hour 893.8 800,348 -1,541 2,000 





The chief goal of this dissertation is to provide reliable empirical evidence for the discussion 
of imperfections in Europe’s wholesale electricity markets. As pointed out in the last two 
chapters, inefficient cross-border trade and the potential exercise of market power weigh 
heavily on a successful outcome. With increased availability, quality and length of data series, 
it became feasible to empirically test a set of theoretically deduced or anecdotal 
hypotheses.158 The novelty of the types of markets and their associated data required 
developing new approaches. Therefore, methods developed in other contexts were carefully 
adapted and applied to often high frequency (up to hourly) electricity market data.159
The study of the Anglo-French electricity interconnector shows that cross-border trading 
strategies of generators, traders and consumers differ and that the exercise of market power in 
explicit auctions can be profitable. If market power mitigation through new netting rules or 
the introduction of implicit auctions fails, competitive traders should be made aware of the 
 
 
A Markov-Regime switching model was used to capture the non-linear interaction of 
electricity, fuel and emission allowance prices. Although used in this dissertation to study the 
differences in German and British price formation, the model may be helpful for risk 
management or forecasting purposes as well. The same holds true for the detection of 
asymmetric pass-through of emission costs to electricity prices. Further research should 
examine whether wholesale and retail electricity prices are also linked asymmetrically. 
 
The study of European electricity price convergence provides an early “snapshot” of the 
markets’ interaction. Day-ahead forecasting of arbitrage potentials using the Kalman Filter is 
of course not only suited to study the foregone arbitrage gains in the past, but can also be used 
in profitable cross-border arbitrage in the future. To better understand the price level 
interactions and the price shock dispersion in Europe, a shock dispersion model (possibly a 
structural Vector Autoregression) would be desirable. This could serve as input for improved 
cross-border hedging strategies. 
 
                                                 
158 Because most of the data were not readily available, this dissertation required collecting and preparing dozens 
of time series. I thank NordPool, the APX Group, EEX and National Grid for providing access to relevant data. 
159 All calculations were implemented and carried out in Matlab, and the corresponding code can be obtained 
from the author upon request. 
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fact that some companies’ behavior is not only driven by the observable price differentials. 
During our research the issue arose of cross-border trade impacts of national renewable 
energy support schemes. As the paragraph on the UK’s levy exemption certificates (p. 88) 
shows, the impacts these incentives have on international electricity flows are often difficult 
to predict. Empirically separating these effects could provide insights into the windfall gains 
and deadweight losses produced by such national policies in the developing common 
European electricity market. 
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Glossary and Abbreviations 
A. Glossary 
 
This glossary introduces the basic concepts of cross-border congestion management schemes. 
More detailed descriptions about some of the methods presented in this dissertation can be 
found in CONSENTEC (2004) and ETSO (2004). 
 
“base”: 0am-12pm 
 “explicit auctions”: National electricity markets exist. The right to use transmission 
capacity is allocated in auctions. 
“first-come-first-served”: National electricity markets exist. The right to use transmission 
capacity is allocated according to a waiting list. 
 “implicit auctions”: A super-national body collects the supply and demand curves in each 
country and allocates the cross-border transmission capacity to optimize welfare. (One 
country = one price)  
“netting”: Flow nominations in opposite directions must be subtracted allowing the new 
net capacities being resold. 
“nodal pricing”: A super-national body collects the supply and demand curves at each 




“pay-as-bid”: The lowest accepted bid of an auction sets the price for all buyers. 
“pro-rata”: National electricity markets exist. The right to use transmission capacity is 
allocated according to the share of individual desired capacity to total desired capacity 
(Who demands more receives more). 
“uniform pricing”: The bidder must pay exactly the price for each bid as if it were 
successful. 
“use it or lose it”: Physical transmission rights must be used or returned to ensure the 
absence of withholding. 
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B. Abbreviations 
ADF Augmented Dickey Fuller test for stationarity 
ADL Autoregressive Distributed Lag (model) 
APX Amsterdam Power Exchange (Netherlands) 
ARA Amsterdam - Rotterdam - Antwerp (Dutch market for coal) 
ARCH Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity  
BSUoS Balancing Services Use of System charges 
CAR Confirmation And Reallocation notice at the IFA 
CCL Climate Change Levy 
CEPS  Czech System Operator 
CHP Combined Heat and Power plant 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
CPP Coal Power Plant 
DKE  East Danish NordPool price area (Denmark) 
DKW West Danish NordPool price area (Denmark) 
EC European Community 
ECM Error Correction Model 
EEX European Energy Exchange, Leipzig (Germany) 
EON E.ON Netz 
ETS Emission Trading System 
EU European Union 
EUA EU Emission Allowance 
EXAA Energy Exchange Austria, Graz (Austria) 
FOC First Order Condition 
HHI Herfendale-Hirshman Index 
IFA Anglo-French electricity Interconnector 
iid Independent and identically-distributed 
KPSS Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin – test for stationarity 
LEC Levy Exemption Certificate 
NAP National Allocation Plan 
NG National Grid 
OMEL Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energía, Madrid (Spain) 
OTC Over-The-Counter 
OTE  Czech Market Operator, Prague (Czech Republic) 
PCA Principal Component Analysis 
PNX Powernext, Paris (France) 
PPX Polish Power Exchange, Warsaw (Poland) 
PSE Polish System Operator 
RTE Réseau de Transport d'Electricité 
SMRC Short run marginal cost 
SWE Swedish NordPool price area 
TNUoS Transmission Network Use of System charges 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
TTF Title Transfer Facility hub in the Netherlands  
UK United Kingdom 
UKPX UK Power Exchange, London (United Kingdom) 
US United States 
VE-T Vattenfall Europe Transmission 
ZDT Zonal Demand Tariff 
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C. Company names 
1 ACCE - Accord Energy 10 CARE - Cargill PLC 19 MSCG - Morgan Stanley 
2 ARON - J.Aron & 
Company 
11 DUKE - Duke Energy 
International Ltd 
20 PGEN E.ON UK plc 
3 AELE – Aquila Energy Ltd 
(Npower Limited ) 
12 DYNE - Dynegy UK Ltd 
 
21 SEME - Sempra Energy 
Europe Ltd 
4 AEPE – AEP Energy 
Services Ltd 
13 EDEF - Electricité de 
France Generation & 
Trading 
22 SETL - Shell Energy Trading 
Limited 
5 AXIE - Merrill Lynch 
Commodities LTD 
14 ELEE - Electrabel SA 23 STAT - Statkraft Markets 
Gmbh 
6 BARB - Barclays Bank plc 15 FHCE - First Hydro 
Company 
24 TFEE - Total Gas & Power 
Ltd 
7 BKWE - BKW FMB 
Energie AG 
16 INNE - RWE nPOWER 
PLC 
25 TXUE - TXU Europe Energy 
Trading BV 
8 BHPB - BHP Billiton 
Marketing AG 
17 GASE - Gaselys 26 VATT - Vattenfall AB 
9 BPGE - BP Gas Marketing 
Limited 
18 LPAS - El Paso Merchant 
Energy Europe 
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MWhel Megawatt hour of electric energy 
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